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The actual cost of the multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) quotas to
exporting developing countries could be considerably higher
than conventional estimates that assume that exporters seize all
the scarcity rents. For U.S. apparel imports from Hong Kong, the
authors' findings point to a 50-50 sharing of the rents between
the exporters and the importers.
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The  post-World  War II era  is often  hailed  as a  period  of great  trade
liberalization  --  through  successive  rounds  of negotiations  conducted  under
the  auspices  of  GATT, industrial  country  tariffs  have  been  pared  down  to their
present  average  level  of about  4  per cent  on manufactured  goods.
Unfortunately,  this  reduction  in  tariff  rates  has  been  accompanied  by a
proliferation  of  non-tariff  barriers.  Among  the  most important  of these  non-
tariff  barriers  for  developing  countries  is the  MFA, or Multi-Fibre
Arrangement,  which  sanctions  a structure  of country-  and  product-specific
quotas  on apparel  and  textiles,  often  the  most important  area of  manufacturing
advantage for  developing  countries.
The  MFA  has  been  widely  studied  and  much attention  has been  devoted  to
its  welfare  consequences.1  However,  this  literature  has  been based  on the
presumption  of perfect  competition  in  all relevant  markets  and  has  suppressed
dynamic  aspects  of the  issues.  In such  models,  as is  well known,  tariffs  and
quotas  are  equivalent  and  license  prices,  when available,  equal  the implicit
specific  tariff.  This  makes  it straightforward  to  calculate  the  welfare
effects  of the  system  and  to identify  losers  and  winners  from  the  MFA and  any
of its  proposed  reforms.
The  assumption  of competitive  markets  in the  study  of the  MFA is  usually
defended  on the  grounds  that  chere  are  a large  number  of producers  in the
textile  and  apparel  market.  In the  case  of some  advanced  exporters,  notably
Hong  Kong,  further  justification  is  provided  by the  fact  that  the  quotas  are
efficiently  implemented  and  are, to  a large  extent,  transferable.  For  example,
Morkre  (1984)  estimates  that  US clothing  import  quotas  on Hong  Kong in 1980
spawned  quota  rents  of $218  million,  or 23 per  cent  of the  total  value  of2
clothing  imports  fror long  Kong.  The  central  f£sture  of his  methodology  is
that  "...  the  price  of rights  to  export  textiles  from  Hong  Kong measures  the
g;ap  between  import  price  and  unit  cost in  Hong  Kong.  The rationale  is that
textile  quotas  are  openly  traded  in  Hong  Kong so that  the  market  price  for
transfers  Is  expected  to reflect  the  value  of the  price-cost  difference." 2',
Hamilton  (1986)  also  uses  Hong  Kong quota  prices  to  measure  rent income.
In addition,  he uses specially-compiled  sets  of clothin,  import  statistics  to
calculate  f.o.b.  unit  values  for  Hong  Kong exports  to tha  US,  which  serve  as
proxies  for  tile  rent-inclusive  export  prices.  Dividing  rent  incone  by the
rent-inclusive  US value  of exports,  he arrives  at the  US export  tax  equivalent
rate  of textile  and  apparel  quotas  on Hong  Kong,  which  he then  converts  to the
import  tariff  equivalent  (MTE)  rate  by taking  the  ratio  of c.i.f.  and f.o.b.
values  of clothing  imports  from  Hong  Kong.  He calculates  this  MTE rate  as 9
per  cent in 1981  and 37  per  cent in 1982.
Trela  and  Whalley  (1988,  1990)  employ  a general  equilibrium  model  to
analyze  the  effects  of  bilateral  quota  restrictions  imposed  by the  US, Canada
and the  EC on 14  product  categories  from  34 developing  countries  (including
Hong  Kong).  Like  Morkre,  their  methodology  for  obtaining  the  supply  price  of
quota  restricted  products  involves  the  use of data  on  Hong Kong  quota  prices:
they  compute  the  Hong Kong  supply  price  by subtracting  the  quota  price  from
the  US price,  then they  compute  the  production  costs  of quota  restricted
products  in  other  exporting  countries  by multiplying  the  unit cost in  Hong
Kong  with the  ratio  of the  exporting  country's  relative  wage rate  in the
textile  and  apparel  industry  compared  to  Hong  Kong.  Using  1986  data, they
estimate  both  global  and  national  welfare  costs  of the  KFA.  Their  results
suggest  global  gains  from  the  elimination  of quotas  and  tariffs  of more than3
$17  billion  --  of  which  $11  billion  will  accrue  to  developing  countries  --  and
gains  to the  US from  the  removal  of quotas  of $3  billion.
We do not, in  this  paper,  question  the  assumption  of  perfect  competition
a  priori.  Rather,  we ask if it is  possible  to test  whether  all the  results  of
the  static  competitive  model  are  borne  out  in the  data.  Oddly  enough,  this
basic issue  has  never  been  addressed  in the  literature.  Note that
conceptually,  there  exist  two  markets:  the  market  for  products  and  the  market
for  licenses.  In the  product  market,  there  can  be imperfect  competition  on the
side  of the  buyers,  i.e.  monopsony  or oligopsony,  and/or  on the  side  of the
sellers,  i.e.  monopoly  or oligopoly.  In the  license  market,  we need  to
consider  as  well  who owns the  licenses  -- that  is,  whether  the  licenses  are in
the  hands  of the  exporters  (who  may  or may  not  be the  producers  themselve¶i)  or
the  importers  or  buyers  (be  they  consumers  or independent  retailers).  Again,
there  can  be market  power  on either  or both sides  of the  license  market.
Clearly,  many different  combinations  of imperfections  can  arise  in the two
markets  and it is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  to study  them all.  Our
approach  is  not  to point  to  and  model  a particular  form  of imperfection  but to
see  whether  the implications  of perfect  competition  in all  markets  do in fact
hold.
It is  well  understood  that  when  market  imperfections  exist,  product
prices  become  endogenous,  thus  allowing  producers  to  appropriate  quota  rents
by raising  their  supply  price.  In this  case,  a quota  has  very different
effects  from  a tariff  which  generates  the  same level  of imports.  In
particular,  the  price  difference  between  the  quota-restricted  and  world
markets,  which  we will  call the  potential  rent  per license,  need  not equal  the
tariff  which  would induce  this  level  of imports.  For this  rsason,  licence4
prices  need  not reflect  import-equivalent  tariffs.  (See  Krishna  (1990a).)
More  ver, the  p  ential  rb t  per license  need not  equal  the  actuAal
license  price  If there  is "rent  sharing".  This is  to  be distinguished  from
"rent  appropriation".  The distinction  is  crucial.  By affecting  product  prices
themselves,  producers  with market  power  in  effect  appropriate  rents  from
quotas.  We will call this  "rent  appropriation"  and  use "rent  sharing"  to
denote  the  sharing  of potential  rents  between  the  license  holders  and other
agents,  given  the  price  differential  created  by the  quota.  In other  words,
rent  sharing  is said  to  occur  when the  the  license  price  falls  short  of the
price  differential  in the  quota-restricted  and  world  markets.  As we argue  in
the  next  section,  the  theoretical  literature  in the  area  has focused  on rent
appropriation  and  has ignored  rent  sharing.  Our  paper  attempts  to fill  this
gap  by testing  for  rent  sharing  in the  MFA.
We base our  empirical  case  on Hong  Kong  because  it is  often  held up as
the  best-functioning  and  most competitive  exporter  of clothing  to the  US.
Licenses  are  relatively  freely  traded  in  Hong  Kong  compared  to other  MFA-
restricted  countries,  and the  quota  implementation  process  is clearly
documented.  As a result,  it is the  least  likely  to  exhibit  behavior  consistent
with market  imperfections.  Evidence  of  any such  behavior  from  Hong Kong  would
therefore  cast  substantial  doubt  on the  suitability  of the  static  competitive
model  for  analyzing  the  effects  of the  MFA.
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  In the  next section,  we first  outline
the  competitive  model,  then  we discuss  how different  kinds  of imperfections
may affect  the  results  of this  model.  We argue  that  rent  sharing  can  occur
when there  is  market  power  on the  side  of  buyers,  which  may or may  not  be
combined  with imperfections  'n the  license  market.  As our focus  is  nottheoretical,  we us-  very simple  versions  of these  models.  However,  the flavor
of che  results  carries  over in  more general  versions.  In Section  3,  we briefly
discuss  the  data  we use.  Details  of  how 'h.  data  were  put together  can  be
found  in the  Data  Appendix,  which  carefully  describes  our  sources  and
procedures  as well  as the  problems  that  remain  with the  data.  In Section  4, we
give  a quick  summary  of Hong  Kong's  textile  quota  system.
Section  5 sets  up the  first  model  we test.  This  model  deals  with testing
for  rent sharing  in the  pzesence  of quotas  when imports  and  domestically-
produced  goods  are  homogeneous.  We extend  this  in Section  6 to incorporate
compositional  differences  in the  aggregate  goods  whilst  maintaining  the
homogeneity  assumption  of its  component  parts.  Section  7 deals  with the
implications  of product  differentiation.  Section  8 analyzes  the  factors
influencing  rent  sharing.  Section  9 summarizes  our results  and  makes  some
concluding  remarks.6
2.  The Basic  Models
2.1  Perfect  Comoetitio'
The  bass  case (which  constitutes  our  null  hypothesis  in  Section  5) is
one  with competition  in all  the  relevant  markets.  Both  the  demand  and  supply
sides  of the  product  market  are  assumed  to  be competitive  and, in  addition,
license  holders  act  competitively  ar.d  are  willing  and  able to sell  at the
price  that  clears  the license  market.
This  zodel  is illustrated  diagramatically  in  Figure  1,  which is the
standard  textbook  depiction.  In Figure  1,  RD represents  residual  damand  from
the importing  country  which  we will  call the  US. It is given  by subtracting  US
supply  and supply  from  sources  other  than  Hong  Kong from total  demand  in the
US.  RS depicts  the  residual  supply  from  Hong Kong.  This is supply  from  Hong
Kong less  demand  from  all  sources  other  than  the  US. The intersection  of the
two  gives  the  world  price  in the  absence  of quotas  and the  level  of imports
from  Hong  Kong to the  US. If  a quota  is  set  allowing  only  V units  to be
imported,  the  home  price  at  which  this  level  of imports  is demanded  exceeds
the  world  price  at  which  it is supplied.  T'heir  difference  gives  the license
price,  which  can  be interpreted  as the  implicit  tariff.  That is,  if the  quota
were replaced  by a specific  tariff  at this  level,  the  same  amount  of imports
would  be induced.  Tariffs  and  quotas  are  therefore  equivalent.
2.2  Market  power  on the  seller's  side:  "rent  anDropriation"
As is  weli  known,  the  above  argument  breaks  down  with imperfectly
competitive  markets.  Bhagwati  (1965)  analyzes  three  departures  from the  base
model  of competition  (which  he calls  case  1).  He looks  at the  effect  of
monopoly  in domestic  supply  and  in the  license  market,  as  well as some
combinations  of these.  When there  is  monopoly  only  in domestic  supply,  a quota7
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makes  demand  less  elastic  for  price  increases,  thereby  augmenting  monopoly
power.  As a tariff  does  not  eliminate  the  foreign  supply  response,  we get  non-
equivalence  between  the  two.  This is  his  case 2.
In his  case 3,  he considers  competitive  supply  at home and  abroad,  but
monopoly  in license  noldings.  By affecting  the  utilization  of licenses,  the
monopolist  holder  of licenses  affects  their  value.  The  uti..ization  rate is
chosen  to  maximize  total  license  value.  This  makes  the  effective  quota
endogenous  and  creates  non-equivalence  between  tariffs  and quotas.
In  his  case  4, he adds  monopoly  in  domastic  supply  to  his case  3. He
considers  two  sub-cases:  4a,  where  the  license  holder  is  not the  domestic
monopolist;  and  4b,  where  he is the  domestic  monopolist.  Thus,  4a  becomei  a
case  where  the  home market  is  a duopoly.  The  solution  concept  chosen  is
essentially  a Cournot-  Nash  equilibrium.  Here,  a quota  changes  the  market
structure  whereas  a tariff  does  not, so the  two  are  not  equivalent.  In 4b, the
monopolist  holds  all the  licences  and so  he can  even further  augment  his
monopoly  power  over  casc 2  by effectively  choosing  his  utilization  ratio  to
maximize  the  sum  of profits  and license  revenues.  As a quota  enhances  his
monopoly  power,  it is  again  not  equivalent  to a tariff.
Bhagwati  does  not  address  the  possibility  of foreign  market  power.  If
the  foreign  sellers  have  market  power,  no supply  curve  exists  as the  supply
price is  chosen  to  maximize  profits.  This  makes  the  world  price  a choice
variable  and its  determination  the  result  of profit-maximizing  decisions  of
the  suppliers.  If the  sellers  have  no licenses,  the,  will  have  an incentive  to
raise  their  price  to  obtain  the  rents  from  the  quota. 4
Take, for  example,  the  case  where  there  is  a single  foreign  supplier  of
the  product  and  markets  are segmented.  It is  clearly  optimal  for  the9
monopolist  to raise  his  price  in  response  to  a quota  so as to appropriate  the
entire  quota  rent,  By closing  the  gap  between  the  demand  price  and  the  supply
price,  the  monoDolist  effectively  strips  the  licenses  of any  value.  rhis  model
with segmented  markets  is developed  diagramatically  in  Takscs  (1987)  and is
mentioned  in Shibata  (1968)  as  well,  and  mo&c recently  in  Krugman  and  Helpman
(1989).
Krishna  (1990b,  1990c)  further  develops  a model  in  which there  is
costless  arbitrage  between  the  markets  so the  foreign  monopolist  cannot
practise  price  discrimination. 5 The  monopolist's  price  is an endogenous
variable  --  by charging  a  high  price,  he can  appropriate  rants  and  he chooses
to  do so if this  is profitable.  Of course,  this  price  depends  on the  quota
level  and  his allocation  of licenses.  Even  here,  as long  as the license  market
is frictionless  and  competitive,  i~.  is  still  the  case .hat  the  value  of a
license  equals  the  difference  in  the  domestic  price  and  the  world  price.
However,  in this  med'el  as  well  as in those  of Bhagwati  discussed  previously,
thie  licen  price  is endogenous  and  deper.ds  on  other  oarameters  such  as the
allocation  of licenses  and  the  product  market  structure  and  behavior.
To summarize,  the  existence  of markpt  imperfections  in general  can
result  in the  non-equivalence  of tariffs  and  quotas.  However,  our  focus  is  not
or the  equivalence  issue  but  on  what the  licence  price  reflects.  In other
words,  we are  concerned  with  rent  sharing  and  not  rent  appropriation.  When
there  is  product  market  power  on the  seller's  side,  the  license  price  becQaes
an endogenous  variable  used  by the  producer  to  effect  rent  appropriation.
However,  the  identity  continues  to  hold that  the  license  price  is equal  to the
difference  between  the  domestic  (demand)  price  and  the  world (supply)  price,
so that  there  is  no rent  sharing.10
2.3  Market  oower  on the  buyer's  side:  "rent  sharing"
If there  is  monopsony  power,  that is,  if there  is  a single  buyer,  then
the  story  is  quite  different.  Assume  that  the  licence  market  is competitive  as
is the  supply  side.  In  Figure  2, the  monopsonist  retailer  has a  marginal
revenue  curve,  MR,  which is  derived  from  the  market  demand  for  apparel,  D, and
he faces  an upward  sloping  supply,  S. His  marginal  cost  curve,  MC, lies to the
left  of S; this  is  because  he has  to pay  a higher  price  for  all  the
inframarginal  units  in order  to  purchase  an additional  unit of apparel.
Unter  free  trade,  the  monopsonist  will import  VF units  of apparel,  which
is given  by the  intersection  of MC and  MR.  The lowest  price  at  which this
quantity  will  be supplied  is pF,  and  the  monopsonist  is  willing  to  pay  up to
p*  Since  he is the  sole  importer,  however,  he can  choose  his price  and so  he
will offer  the  lowest  price,  pF,  and  sell  the  goods  in the  home market  at
price  P .
Now  suppose  a quota,  V, is imposed  on apparel  imports.  The  monopsonist's
supply  curve  then  becomes  the  kinked  line,  ABE and  his  marginal  cost curve
becomes  ACE.  The lowest  price  at  which  the  quota  amount  will be supplied  is
PS(V),  and the  monopsonist  will not  pay  more  then  PD(V),  which is the  price
for  which  he will sell  the  imports  in the  home  market.  If  he pays P,  where
PS(V)  < p 5 pD(V),  then  the  price  of a quota  license  will  be P-PS(v),  i.e.  the
difference  between  the  price  paid  and the  supply  price  charged.  Of course,  the
monopsonist  will  never  choose  to  pay  more than  the  supply  price  charged  so he
will  buy the  V units  at  price  PS(V)  and the  license  price  will  be zero.  Note
that  this  occurs  not  because  there  is  no price  differential  in the  home and
world  markets,  but  because  the  monopsonist,  as  the  only importer  of  the  good,
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is,  the  lower  will  be the  price  paid  by the  monopsonist.  In any case,  the
competitive  exporters  are  paid  exactly  enough  to induce  them  to sell  and  they
receive  no rent. 6
It is important  for  us to emphasize  that in  this  case,  unlike  all  the
previous  ones  discussed,  the  license  price  is  not given  by the  deviation  of
the  domestic  price  from  the  world  price.  The  license  to import  only  has  value
if the  price  offered  by the  monopsonist  exceeds  the  supply  price.  Since  the
monopsonist  has sole  buying  power,  the  license  price  is  always  zero.  The
difference  between  the  home  price  and the  world  price,  however,  is  given  by
PD(V)_pS(V)  in  Figure  2, and  it is  n  equal  to  zero.  Thus,  monopsony  power
causes  the  license  price  to  diverge  from  the  difference  in the  supply  and
demand  price.
Now  suppose  there  is  competitive  supply  but  concentration  in  license
holdings  as well  as market  power  on the  buyer's  side.  This seems  like  a better
assumption  for  the  US-Hong  Kong  apparel  trade  situation,  since  the  mere
existence  of active  trading  in quota  licenses  in  Hong  Kong is evidence  that
the  license  have  value.  In this  case,  there  is  bilateral  monopoly  power,  and
the  issue  becomes  one  of sharing  the  potential  license  rents.  The  potential
rent from  a license  equals  the  difference  in the  supply  price in  Hong  Kong  and
the  demand  price  in the  US market.  If a  price  between  these  is the  outcome  of
the  bargaining  process,  then  the  license  price  is  positive.  However,  the  two
prices  are  not separated  by exactly  the  license  price  because  of rent
sharing. 7
As a stark  illustration  of this  argument,  suppose  that  all the  import
licenses  are  held  by a single  exporter  (who  may or  may  not  be a  producer),  and
that  the  license  price is  determined  by a  tNash  bargaining  process  between  the13
monopsonist  and  the  license  holder.  The  license  holder's  objective  is to
maximize  his profit  ELI  where:
-L  - VL.
The  monopsonist's  objective  is to  maximize  his  profit  xM,  where:
-M (  [PD(V)  - L - PS(V)]V.
pD(*)  is the  inverse  residual  demand  function  and  PS(.)  is the inverse
residual  import  supply  function,  so PD(V)  is the  demand  price  and  PS(V)  is the
supply  price  for  the  quota,  V units.  The license  price  is found  by maximizing
the  weighted  product  of  both  parties'  deviation  from  their  fall-back  payoff:
II  - (VL)#[(PD(V)-PS(V)-L)V]l-f.
For  simplicity,  we assume  both  parties  receive  nothing  in the  absence  of an
agreement,  so their  fall-back  payoffs  are  equal  to zero. 8 The  parameters  P  and
(1-P)  represent  the  bargaining  strengths  of the  license  holder  and  the
monopsonist  respectively,  where  0  S p  <  1.
The first  order  condition  is:
VL (l-P)[PD(V)_PS(V)-L]I-p[(pD(V).PS(V))-L]  - 0,
which  yields  the  solutions:
L - 0,
L _ pD(v)-pS(v)
and  L - [PD(V)_PS(V)],
of  which  only the  third  satisfies  the  second  order  condition  for  a  maximum.
Therefore  the  license  price  which  is the  outcome  of the  Nash  bargaining  setup
between  the  license  holder  and the  monopsonist  is  given  by:
L - p[PD(V)_PS(V)].
The  more  powerful  the  license  holder  is,  the  higher  is the  license  price.  In
the  extreme  case  when  P-1, the  license  holder  has  all the  bargaining  power  and14
so he extracts  the  entire  quota  rent  VL,  where  the  license  price  L is  exactly
equal  to the  difference  between  the  demand  and supply  prices.  At the  opposite
extreme  when  P-0, the  monopsonist  calls  all  the  shots:  for  each  unit,  he pays
only the  supply  price  P and  reaps  the  rent  given  by the  difference  between  the
demand  and supply  prices.  The  license  holder  gets  nothing  as the  license  price
is equal  to zero.  For  a  value  of  fi  between  0 and  1, an intermediate  result
will obtain  and  the  license  price  will not  reflect  the full  difference  between
the  demand  and  supply  prices.
In Section  5, we look  at the  relationship  between  the  US price  and the
Hong Kong  price,  which includes  the  license  price  as well as tariffs  and
transport  costs.  In the  absence  of rent  sharing,  as argued  above,  these  two
should  be equal.  Moreover,  their  difference  should  not  depend  on factors  such
as concentration  in  quota  holdings  and the  quota  size  and  utilization  ratio.
In this  way, we estimate  the  extent  of rent  snaring  and  the  factors  that seem
to be influencing  it.  In Section  6,  we allow  for  compositional  effects  to
create  differences  in aggregate  prices;  in Section  7,  we test if  prices  differ
because  of product  differentiation;  and  in Section  8,  we analyze  the
determinants  of rent  sharing.15
3.  The  Data
The  data  utilized  in this  study  cover  the  time  period  1981-88  and
pertain  to three  broad  areas:  domestically-produced  apparel,  imported  apparel
from  Hong  Kong  and license  holdings  for  apparel  imports  from  Hong Kong.  We did
not  attempt  to  obtain  data  on all  categories  of apparel.  There  are  severe
difficulties  in assembling  a  consistent  panel  of data due  to the  different  and
changing  classification  systems  used in reporting  information  on imports  and
domestic  production.  Therefore,  we chose  groups  of apparel  such  that  these
consistency  problems  were  minimized.  Our  objective  was to  get as  many
relatively  consistently-defined,  disaggregated  groups  that  we could  find  or
develop  concordances  for  between  the  different  classification  systems
employed.
We identified  ten  such  groups.  They  are: (1)  dresses;  (2)  skirts; (3)
playsuits; (4)  sweaters; (5)  trousers; (6)  men's  coats;  (7)  women's  coats;
(8)  woven  shirts; (9)  knit shirts; and (10)  underwear.  We obtained  data for
these  groups  for  the  following  variables  between  1981  and 1988.  The  variables
are  defined  below.  In our  notation,  the  subscript  i indexes  the  apparel  group,
and t indexes  the  year.
Pit  us  - Unit value of US production.
Pit  HK  . F.O.B.  Hong  Kong  price. This includes  the  license  price.
tit  - Ad valorem tariff in the US.
Tit  - Transport  cost  per  unit from  Hong  Kong to the  US.
Pit  HK  _  Adjusted Hong Kong price, where:
Pi  HK  _  PitHK  (1  + tit)  + Tit.
Qit  us  - US sales of US production.
Qit  HK  _  Imports from Hong Kong.16
Hit  - Numbers  equivalent  of the  Herfindahl  index  of concentration
in licence  holding.
vit  - Quota  level  for  imports.
uit  - Utilization  ratio  of imports,  where:
uit  - Qit  /vit.
The sources  of these  data  and  details  on  how they  were  crested  can  be
found  in the  Data  Appendix.17
4. Hong  Kong's  Textile  Ouota  System
Hong  Kong  prides  itself  on administering  an efficient  textile  quota
system.  The initial  quota  allocation  is  historically  based.  Past  performance,
transfers  and  quota  level  changes  guide  the  process  by which  these  allocations
change  in  subsequent  years.
When  a product  category  is  newly  brought  under  restraint,  the  quotas  are
allocated  according  to  past  performance9,  i.e.  each  company  gets  a quota
amount  corresponding  to its  share  in total  shipments  of that  particular
category  to the  market  concerned.  Where  the  manufacturer  and the  exporter  are
not the  same  company,  they  each share  the  quota  pertaining  to a shipment  on a
50/50  basis. 10 If the  level  of total  shipments  exceeds  the  restraint  limit,
the  allocations  are  scaled  down  proportionately.  If the  quota  is larger  than
total  past  performance,  then  the  balance  remaining  is  put into  a "free  quota
pool",  which  is  open to  any firm  registered  with the  Hong  Kong  Trade
Department  which  has documentary  proof  of an overseas  order.
Quota  holders  are  allowed  to transfer  a  part  of their  quota  to other
firms.  There  are two  types  of quota  transfers:  permanent  transfers,  in which
the  transferee  obtains  the  use  of the  qLota  for  the  year in  question  and,
based  on its  performance  against  the  transferred  amount,  receives  a quota
allocation  in the  following  year;  and temporary  transfers,  in  which  the
transferee  obtains  the  use  of the  quota  for  the  year in  question,  but the
performance  against  the  transferred  quantity  is  attributed  to the  transferor.
In  order  to allow  sufficient  time  for  the  transferee  to  obtain  the  quota,
transfer  applications  are  not  normally  accepted  after  the  middle  of November.
Free quotas  are  not transferable.
Under  Hong  Kong's  textile  quota  system,  both the  utilization  rate and18
the  amount  of transfers  are  important  factors  in  determining  a  firm's  future
quota  allocation.  A firm  which  uses less  than  95  per cent  of its  quota  holding
will  obtain  an allocation  in the  subsequent  year equal  to the  amou.'.  it  used;
a firm  which  uses  95 per  cent  or more  of its  quota  holding  will be given  an
allocation  equal  to 100  per  cent  of its  holding;  and a firm  which  uses  95 per
cent  or more  of its  quota  holding  and  does  not transfer  out  any  of its  quota
(on  either  a temporary  or permanent  basis)  will  be awarded  an additional
amount  equivalent  to the  growth  factor  for  that  category  provided  for in the
restraint  agreement.
In  addition,  a firm  which  transfers  out 50  per  cent or  more of its  quota
holdings  on a temporary  basis  in  a year is liable  to  have its  quota  allocation
reduced  in the  following  year,11  whereas  a firm  which  transfers  in  35 per cent
or more  of its  quota  holdings  on a temporary  basis  during  the  year is  eligible
for  a bonus  allocation  in the  following  year.
Finally,  a firm  which  obtains  a free  quota  and  utilizes  95 per  cent or
more  of it  qualifies  for  a  quota  allocation  in the  subsequent  year;  a firm
which  fails  to  utilize  at least  95  per  cent  of its  free  quota  may  be debarred
from  future  participation  in free  quota  schemes  for  a period  of time.
To a certain  extent,  unused  quotas  may  be transferred  between  categories
(under  the  "swing  provision")  and  between  years  (under  the "carry-over"  and
"carry-forward  provisions").
As quota  entitlements  in  a subsequent  restraint  period  are  based  on
shipment  performance  in the  preceding  period,  quotas  can  only  be allocated
after  this  performance  has  been fully  verified  against  shipping  documents.
This  verification  process  usually  takes  two  to three  months.  In order  to  make
a portion  of the  quotas  available  during  the  first  few  months  of the  year,19
therefore,  the  Trade  Department  makes  preliminary  quota  allocations  to
companies.  Final  quota  allocations  are  normally  made ira  March  and they
supersede  any  preliminary  allocations.
All textile  and apparel  exports  from  !long  Kong  have to be covered  by
valid  export  licenses  issued  by the  Director  of Trade.  Export  licenses  are
only issued  to firms  which  are  able to supply  quota  to cover  the  consignment
in  question.  Valid licenses  are required  to  bring  the  shipment  on board.  An
export  license  is  normally  valid  for  28 days  from  the  date of issue  (or,  where
applicable,  until  the end  of the  year,  whichever  is  earlier).  The  consignment
must  be shipped  within  this  period.  The final  licensing  date is  the  first  day
of December.  All licenses  covering  shipments  applied  for  against  quotas  held
by a company  have to  be taken  out  not later  than  this  date,  although  shipments
may  be effected  up to the  last  day  of the  year.
Further  details  of Hong  Kong's  textile  quota  system  can  be found  in the
Hong  Kong  Trade  Department  publication,  Textiles  Export  Control  System.  A good
description  of the  system  is also  contained  in  Morkre  (1979,  1984).20
5. Testing  for  Rent  Sharing:  Homogeneous  Goods
In this  and the  following  two  sections,  we develop  and implement
procedures  to test  for  the  existence  of rent  sharing.  In the  case  of
homogeneous  goods,  if there  is  no rent sharing,  the  license  price  equals  the
difference  in the  price  of US goods  and the  price  of imports  from  Hong  Kong
when the latter  is  adjusted  for  tariffs  and transportation  costs.  Our  data-set
for  the ten  apparel  groups  does  not  contain  license  prices  explicitly.
However,  the license  price  is included  in the  f.o.b.  Hong  Kong price.
Therefore,  we can test  for  rent  sharing  by looking  at whether  the f.o.b.  price
in Hong  Kong,  adjusted  for  tariffs  and transport  costs,  equals  the  US price.
Figures  3(i)-(x)  are  scattergrams  of these  two  sets  of prices  for  each
of the ten  apparel  groups.  In  each scattergram,  the  points  either  lie  entirely
above  the  45 degree  line  or entirely  below it,  indicating  that the  US price
and  the  licensa-inclusive  Hong  Kong  price  are  not equal.  However,  when the
data  are  pooled,  as in  Figure  3(xi),  the  points  appear  to lie  more or less
around  the  45 degree  line  --  this  prima  facie  evidence,  then.  seems  to
discount  the  existence  of rent  sharing!  Yet,  while  it seems  reasonable  to
assume  that  Hong Kong  producers  are  competitive,  it  is  not clear  that  market
power  does  not  exist  in  the  market  for  quota  licenses  and  on the side  of the
US purchasers.  For  example,  an editorial  in the  Hong  Kong trade  journal,
Textile  Asia,  alleges  that:  "Quota  price  fluctuations  do  not in  fact reflect
normal  supply  and  demand  but the  course  of  manipulation  by the  quota
holders;" 1 2 and  Goto (1989)  claims  that:  "Although  governments  of exporting
countries  under  the  MFA often  allocate  export  licenses  in a  marLner  that  helps
exporters  capture  the  quota  rent,  many  of these  exporters  face  large  importing
enterprises  that  can  negotiate  prices  that  capture  some  of the  rent for21
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themselves.113  As argued  in Section  2, the  existence  of monopsony  power  can
lead  to rent  sharing.
This is separate  from  the  issue  of whether  or not  product  markets  are
perfect  on the  sellers'  side.  Imperfect  product  markets  per  se do not imply
rent  sharing  as we define  it,  although  they  do affect  who  gains  and  who loses
from  a quota. We focus  only  on rent  sharing,  which  results  from  buyer  power
and  not on rent  appropriation,  which  results  from  seller  power.
In regression  (1),  we regress  the  adjusted  Hong  Kong price  on the  US
price,  a constant,  the  quota  utilization  ratio,  the  quota  level  and the
numbers  equivalent  of the  Herfindahl  Index,  which  measures  concentration  in
the license  holdings  and  proxies  for  market  power in  the  license  market.  The
numbers  equivalent  of the  Herfindahl  Index  is  defined  as  l/Zsi 2,  where  s
equals  the  share  of license  holder  i in  total  licenses.  Regression  (1)  is
therefore  of the  form:
(1)  pit  HK  a  +  Pitus  + rHit  +  6Uit  +  oVit +  fit
The right-hand-side  variables  can  be considered  as exogenous  variables.
If the  US is  a large  country, Pit  s  is  properly  taken  as given.  As quota
license  allocations  are  historically  determined,  Hit  can  be also  taken  as
given  though  it  does  vary  over  time  with the  composition  of exports.  The quota
level, Vit,  is  exogenously  determined.  The  utilization  rate,  Uit,  should
be unity  if the  quota  is  binding,  and  any  departure  from  unity  is assumed  to
reflect  exogenous  difficulties  in  attaining  full  utilization  due to frictions
in the implementation  system.
The  regression  is  run  on  pooled  data  across  the  ten  apparel  groups  for
the  years  1981  through  1988.  If there  is  no rent  sharing  and  the  goods  are
homogeneous,  we should  expect  to  observe PitHK  - PitUS. In other  words,  in25
regression (1), the constant should be zero and thc coefficient on the US
price should be unity; furthermore, none of  the other variables should be
significant. The assumption that US and Hong Kong apparel are perfect
substitutes ensures that the license-inclusive Hong Kong price has to equal
the domestic price in the US. This means that the Hong Kong supply price
(exclusive of the license price) has to vary one for one with the license
price. For example, if the US is a large country, a reduction in the quota
level will tend to raise the  license price; but this will be wholly absorbed
by the Hong Kong suppliers, who will have to reduce their supply price so  as
to remain competitive. Therefore, a quota reduction will make licenses
costlier, but reduce the supply price at the same time so that  PitHK  remains
unchanged overall. Similarly, changes in the license utilization rate will
affect the license price but not  PitHK  since the supply price will adjust to
maintain the equality between  PitHK  and  PitUS. The concentration of license
holdings should not affect  PitHK  unless there are substantial search costs.
The results of regression (1) are reported in Table 1. Note that  a is
significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level, and that Hong Kong
prices are lower than US prices in general. This suggests that the license
price embodied in  PitHK  falls short of the gap between the domestic price
(PitUs)  and the world price. Moreover, we are able to conclusively reject the
null hypothesis of perfect competition everywhere, i.e. the hypothesis that
8-1  and  a-r-6-0-O  jointly. The hypothesis that  8-1  can be rejected at the
I  per cent level. The regression results may be interpreted as follows.
We can think of  a  as the fixed component of rent sharing and  p  as
the marginal component of rent sharing. A S1 increase in the US price,
therefore, is associated with a $0.53 increase in the Hong Kong price  --  this26
TABLE  1
RESULTS  FOR  THE  HOMOGENEOUS  GOODS  MODEL (EOUATION  1)
Dependent variable - PitHK
Independent
Variables  Coefficient  t Statistic
Constant  -7.4140  -2.7111a
( 2.  7374  )
PitUS  0.5271  9.7766a
(0.0539)
Hit  0.1255  4.5439a
(0.0276)
t-tit  0.0964  3.7754a
(0.0255)
Vit  -0.4104  x 10-7  -4.1771a
(0.9825  x  10'8)
R2 - 0.8089,  Adjusted R2 - 0.7979
Number of observations - 75
* Standard  errors  are  in  brackets  beneath  the  estimates  of the
parameters.  (These  standard  errors  do  not  differ  appreciably  from those
obtained  with the  White (1984)  correction,  therefore  we discount  the
possibility  of  heteroskedasticity  in our  sample.)
a Significant  at the 1  per cent  level.
Results  of  hvMothesis-testing:
F-statistic  for  joint  test  of 0-l  and  a-r-6-0-0:
F(5,72) - 25.0740 -- reject the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level.
t-statistic  for  test  of  A-1:
t - -8.6726  --  reject the null hypcthesis at the 1 per cent level.27
may indicate  that  $0.47  of the  price  differential  or rent is retained  in the
us.14
In addition,  note  that  ceteris  paribus,  increasing  license  market
concentration  lowers  the  Hong  Kong  price.  We would  expect  that  greater
concentration  increases  the  bargaining  power  of the license  holders  who  will,
in turn,  seek  to raise  the  license  price.  As the  license  price  is included  in
the  Hong  Kong  price,  we would  therefore  expect  greater  concentration  in
license  holdings  to  be associated  with a  higher  Hong  Kong price.  However,  it
is also  possible  that fragmentary  quota  holdings  make it inconvenient  for
firms  to obtain  sufficient  export  licenses  when they  have large  overseas
orders.  This increased  search  cost  would  then  be reflected  in  a  higher  Hong
Kong  price.  Our results  seem  to suggest  that  the  second  effect  outweighs  the
first;  this  is  not too  surprising  since  the  Hong  Kong quota  system  penalizes
license  hoarding,  thereby  weakening  the  first  effect.  In any  case,  we
reiterate  that  if there  is  no rent  sharing,  the  degree  of concentration  in
license  holdings  should  not  affect  the  equality  of  PitUS  and  PitHK. Yet
the  observed  coefficient  on  Hit  is  significant  at the  1 per  cent level,
which  directly  contradicts  this  prediction.
Although  the  coefficients  on  Uit  and  Vit  are small,  they  are  also
significant  at the  1  per cent  level.  A higher  quota  utilization  rate,  with
everything  else  held constant,  raises  the  Hong  Kong  price.  This could  be
because  a  higher  utilization  rate  makes  licenses  harder  to get.  This increases
the  bargaining  strength  of the  license  holders  and  consequently  raises  the
license  price  and  the  Hong  Kong  price  of which  it is a  component.
A  higher  quota  reduces  the  Hong  Kong  price,  all  else  constant.  Again,
the  reason  for this  may  be due  to the  fact  that  a larger  quota increases28
license  availability  and  reduces  the  power  of license  holders.  This in turn
reduces  the  license  price  and  the  Hong  Kong  price.  Of course,  in the  absence
of rent  sharing,  neither  of these  variables  should  be significant --  PitHK
should  always  adjust  to exactly  match  Pit
The  results  of regression  (1)  therefore  seem  consistent  with the
existence  of  monopsony  power  in  the  market  for  a  homogeneous  good in  the  face
of imperfections  in  the license  market  --  there  seems  to be a gap  between  the
world  price  and  the  domestic  price  which  is  not completely  closed  by the
license  price.29
6.  Allowing  for  a ComRosition  Effect
In the  previous  section,  we found  a price  differential  between  US-
produced  apparel  and imports  from  Hong  Kong.  This seems  to  suggest  that  some
rent  sharing  does  exist.  However,  there  may  be an alternative  explanation  for
this  price  differential,  namely,  that  the  Hong  Kong  product  mix is  not the
same  as that  of the  US.  In  other  words,  the  null  hypothesis  described  in the
beginning  of this  section  may  be  valid  for  the  component  MFA  categories  but
not for  the  aggregate  apparel  groups.  For  example,  the  prices  of cotton
dresses,  wool dresses  and  dresses  made  of  manmade  fibre  may  be the  same  in
both the  US and  Hong  Kong,  but if the  US produces  relatively  more  wool
dresses,  which  are  relatively  more  .pensive,  then  the  unit  price  of  US
dresses  on the  whole  will  exceed  the  unit  price  of Hong  Kong  dresses  on the
whole.  We cannot  directly  compare  the  composition  of the  US and  Hong  Kong
aggregate  goods  since  the  component  categories  are  not the  same.  However,
there  is  a way to get  around  this,  as outlined  below  where  we test  the
importance  of this  composition  effect.
Let  j  denote  the  apparel  group  (j-1,...,10),  and let  i denote  the  MFA
categories  that  make  up apparel  group  j  (i-l,...,n.)  Then PJus US unit  price
of ap',arel  group  J, may  be written  as:
(2)  p  US  - Zi  pijus  (Qijus/Qius)  - Zi  pijUS  wijUS
where  PijUS  is  US unit  price  of the  ith  MFA  category  belonging  to apparel
group  J, QijUS  is  US output  of the  ith  KFA  category  of apparel  group  J, QjUS
is total  US output  of apparel  group  j and  wijUS  is simply  the  quantity  weight
of category  i in apparel  group  J. Similarly,  Hong  Kong  unit  price  of apparel
group  j  may  be written  as:
(3)  PJHK  - Zi  PijHK  (Q,JHK/QJHK)  . Zi  pijHK  wiJHK.30
After  subtracting  (3)  from  (2),  then  adding  and  subtracting
zipijHKwijHK,  vi pijHKwijUS  and  i Pijuswij  HK, the  difference  between  US and
Hong  Kong  unit  prices  of  apparel  group  j  can  be expressed  as:
(4)  Pius  - p HK  - i pijHK(wijUs  witH)
+  Zi  (Pi  US-  PijHK)W,jHK
+ Z, (Pius  PijHK)(wiJUS,  w,JHK)
where  Ei wijus  - vi wijHK  _ 1,  so  E  i (wiius. wijHK)  -0.  In other  words,
the  difference  in  the  US and  Hong  Kong  unit  prices  of apparel  group  j  can  be
broken  down into  a composition  effect  (differences  in  weights),  a price  effect
(differences  in  prices  of component  MFA  categories)  and  an interaction  of the
two  effects,  Note  that  we have information  only  on  PjUS,  PjHK,  PijHK  and
wiJHK.  Since  the  US production  data is  not  broken  down into  MFA  categories,  we
do not  know  Pi)S  and  wijU.  Let  pij denote  the  difference  between  US and
Hong  Kong  weighting  of the  ith  category  of apparel  group  j. Suppose  we make
the  simplifying  assumption  that:
(5)  Pij  US  - aJ + pijK
Then  aj  captures  the  extent  of rent  sharing  as it  denotes  the  price
difference  between  the  US and  Hong  Kong  of apparel  group  j.1 5 If there  is  no
rent  sharing, aj equals  zero.  Putting  (5)  in (4)  gives  us:
(6)  PUS  - pJHK  _ a  + Z,  OijPiJHK
where  Ei Pit  - 0.
Now  we want to test  whether  the  price  difference  between  the  US and  Hong
Kong for  each  apparel  group  J  is  due  to differences  in the  composition  of the
group  or due  to rent  sharing.  Therefore  we are  interested  in the  significance
of the  Pij's  and  aj.  Specifically,  if  our  null  hypothesis  states  that  there
is  no compositional  difference  between  US and  Hong Kong  apparel  groups,  and  no31
rent  sharing,  then oij-0  for  all i, i-l,...,n  and  aj-0.
Consider,  for  example,  a typical  apparel  group  equation  with  n - 3
categories.  Equation  (6)  is  simply:
(7)  pUS  - p1HK _ a- +  olPUljHK +  02JP 2J  +  03 iP 31HK  +
We impose  the  restriction  that Olj+02j+03J  - 0 so that  equation  (7)  becomes:
(8)  Pjus - PjHK _  aj +  2j(P2jHK * PljHK) +  03j(P3HK  - p1 HK) +  ej
We estimate aj,  02j and  03j  by running  an equation  like (8)  for  each  apparel
group  J, J-1,...,10.  Table  2 lists  the  MFA  categories,  i,  used for  each
apparel  group,  j. For  each  equation,  we test  for  the  composition  effect  using
an F-test  of the  hypothesis  that Pij-0  for  all  component  MFA  categories  i,
and  we test  for  the  price  effect  using  a simple  t-test  of the  hypothesis  that
i-0.  We also test  for  both  of these  jointly  using  an F test.
The results  of the  ten  equations  are  shown  in  Table3  3  and  4. For  all
ten  apparel  groups,  we were  unable  to  reject  at the  5  per  cent level  the
hypothesis  that  i  J-0  for  all i.  Thus,  there  seems  to  be little  support  for
the  argument  that  the  price  differential  for  the  apparel  groups  are due  to
differences  in  their  relative  composition.  Admittedly,  the  power  of these
tests  is  very low  since  we have  only  8 observations  for  each  equation.  The
rent  sharing  term,  aj, is significantly  different  from  zero  for  four  apparel
groups:  skirts,  playsuits,  women's  coats  and  underwear.
In the  case  of dresses,  skirts,  woven  shirts  and  knit  shirts,  the  US-
Hong  Kong  price  differential  is  mainly  white  noise,  i.e.  we cannot  reject  at
the 5  per  cent  level  the  hypothesis  that j-0lj-02j-03j-°  For  the  other
apparel  groups,  however,  this  hypothesis  does  not  hold.
To summarize,  we find  no evidence  of compositional  differences  between
the  US- and  Hong  Kong-produced  apparel  groups.  Of the  six  apparel  groups  for32
TABLE2
THE 10  APPAREL  GROUPS  AND
THEIR  COMPONENT  MFA SUB-CATEGORIES
J  1.  2  3  4  5
1.  Dresses  336  436  636
2. Skirts  342  442  642
3.  Playsuits  337  637
4. Sweaters  345  445/6  645/6
5. Trousers  347/8  447/8  647  648
6.  Men's  Coats  334  434  634
7.  Women's  Coats  335  435  635
8.  Woven  Shirts  340  341  440  640  641
9.  Knit Shirts  338/9  438  638/9
10.Underwear  352  652
*  See  the  Data  Appendix  for  descriptions  of the  MFA categories.33
TABLE  3
REGRESSION  RESULTS:  THE COMPOSITION  EFFECT
Equation  a  2J  03j  4j  05j
j-l  0.34002  -0.1027  -0.1053
0.0905  -0.4350  -0.2337
j-2  3.6185  -0.2478  0.1851
2.40550  -1.2968  0.4790
J-3  1.2623  -0.0660
8.4262a  -0.5030
j-4  -0.2386  -0.4971  0.5125
-0.1002  -0.7090  1.2643
j-5  1.5656  0.0115  -0.7184  0.2904
0.9315  0.1375  -2. 7 822 b  0.7976
j-6  2.7328  0.1138  0.1966
1.1172  0.7862  0.6624
j-7  18.1000  -0.3686  0.5052
4.52 97 a  -1. 906 0d  1.5189d
j-8  0.7052  -0.7078  -0.1332  0.2711  0.6418
0.  5990  -1.1430  1.5295  1.1088  1.4053
j-9  1.1831  -0.3450  0.6603
0.6570  -1.2626  1.6 428 d
J-10  0.8183  0.2543
41.3900&  1.7S6gd
The  numbers  in fine  print  are  t-statistics.
a Significant  at the  1  per cent  level.
b Significant  at the  2.5  per cent  level.
c Significant  at the  5  per cent  level.
d Significant  at the  10  per cent  level.34
IABL& 4
THE  COMPOSITION  EFFECT:  RESULTS  OF F-TESTS
Equation  F-statistics  Interpretation
J-1  F(2,5)  - 0.1501  do  not reject  Ho0 :21j0 31°Ob
F(3,5)  - 1.6282  do not reject  HO:al-021-03l_Ob
J-2  F(2,5)  - 0.9281  do not reject  Ho- 0 22-032 _Ob
F(3,5)  - 4.1056  do not reject  HO:a2-022-032  0
j-3  F(1,6)  - 0.2530  do not reject  Ho:  23_Ob
F(2,6)  - 36.584  reject  Ho0a3 -0 23 -0a
j-4  F(2,5)  0.9631  do  not reject  H0:o 24_P34 0ob
F(3,5)  - 16.485  reject  Ho 0: 4-0 24-034 _O
j-5  F(3,4)  - 3.8578  do not  reject  Ho  0 2 3 -.- 045-Ob
F(4,4)  - 20.377  reject  Ho 0: 5-025- 45
j-6  F(2,5)  - 0.5861  do not  reject  Ho  0 26-036 Ob
F(3,5) - 9.7241  reject Ho:(6-026-036_O
j-7  F(2,5)  - 1.8174  do not reject  Hx:O2 7-# 3 7 _ob
F(3,5)  - 101.53  reject H9 a7-027-f37-°
j-8  F(4,3) - 2.9018  do not reject H0 :028- 5  . 8-0  b
F(5,3)  - 5.8012  do not  reject  H0 :a 8-028- .. _p58
j-9  F(2,5)  - 1.4450  do  not reject  Ho  0 29-039 _Ob
F(3,5)  - 5.0231  do  not reject  Ho:a9-029-A3  9_b
j-10  F(1,6)  - 3.1932  do  not reject  Ho:02 lO_,  b
F(2,6)  - 943.15  reject  Ho:* 10 02, 10 -°a
a  At the  1  per cent  level.
b At the  5  per cent  level.35
which  a significant  US-Hong  Kong  price  differential  exists,  three  exhibit  a
significant  rent  sharing  effect.  Only in  four  categories  can  we not reject  the
joint  hypothesis  of no renc  sharing  and  no composition  effect.36
7.  Allowing  for  Differentiated  Products
In  Section  5,  we found  that  the  license-inclusive  price  of Hong  Kong
imports  fell  short  of the  US price.  This,  together  with  our finding  in  Section
6 that  there  was  no substantial  difference  in the  composition  of the  aggregate
apparel  groups  in the  US and  Hong  Kong,  provides  strong  evidence  of the
existence  of rent  sharing  under  the  assumption  of homogeneous  goods.
What if there  exist  real  or perceived  differences  between  US-produced
apparel  and imports  from  Hong  Kong?  If US and  Hong  Kong goods  are  not  perfect
substitutes,  then  the  price  of Hong  Kong  products  (including  the  license
price)  need  not  equal  the  price  of US-produced  clothing,  even  in the  absence
of rent  sharing.  In other  words,  if  we drop  the  assumption  of  homogeneous
goods  then  the  price  differential  observed  in the  previous  sections  could
simply  be an indication  of  product  differentiation  instead  of (or  together
with)  rent  sharing.  While  we are  unable  to  deal  with  product  differentiation
in general  because  of data  limitations,16  we can  control  for  certain  aspects
of it,  as is  done  below.
Suppose  imports  from  Hong  Kong are  of  a different  quality  than
domestically-produced  clothing.  Following  Rodriguez  (1979),  we can think  of
the  quality  of a product  as the  amount  of "services"  obtained  from its
consumption.  These  "services"  are  a homogeneous  good  with  a uniform  price,
sit.  To the  extent  that  two  products  embody  unequal  amounts  of "services",
they  will  differ  in  quality  and  hence,  in  price.  Let  qitUS  denote  the  amount
of "services"  in  one  unit  of US-produced  clothing  i at time  t, and  qit 1i  the
amount  of "services"  in one  unit  of Hong  Kong-produced  clothing  i  at time  t.
Then  PitUS  _-  stqitus + uit  and  PitHK  _  sitqitHK  +  vit,  where  uit  and
vit  are  random  error  terms. Therefore,37
P  p  us  - Sit(qitHK  qitUS)  + Vit  uit,  or:
it  Pitus  + sit(qitHK  - qitUS)  +
where  (it  -v,  - it;  'it  satisfies  the  usual  assumptions  for  a random
error  term.  Let  Zit  denote  the  difference  between  the  quality  of Hong  Kong
clothing  and  US clothing,  i.e. Zit  sit(qitK _ qit)
Recall  regression  (1)  which  was of the  form:
(1)  pit  iK  - a  +  pit  +  THit  +  6Uit  +  vit  +  fit.
Since  we have  no way  of measuring sit,  qitHK or qitUs, we cannot  hold
quality  differences  constant  by including Zit  as an independent  variable  i.n
Equation  (1).  However,  if  we take  quality  differences  to be fixed  over time,
then  we can  control  for  them  using  standard  econometric  techniques. 17 Let
Z-  _  s,(q,HK  - qiUS)/W
where  w  is  a constant; si  is  the  average  price  of a service  from  good i
ovar  the  eight  years; qiHK  is the  average  number  of services  in  a Hong  Kong-
produced  good i  over the  eight  years;  and  q,US  is  the  average  number  of
services  in  a US-produced  good  i over  the  eight  years.  The  fixed  effect, Zi
is therefore  defined  as  (l/l)  times  the  average  US-Hong  Kong quality
difference.
The "true"  equation,  taking  into  account  quality  differences,  should
then  be:
(9)  Pit  HK  +  O  Pit  u+  iHit  +  6'Uit  +  'Vlit  +  frZi  +  fit
By assuming  homogeneity  and thereby  excluding Zi,  Equation  (1)  has
regression  coefficients  which  suffer  from  omitted  variable  bias.  The sign  of
the  bias could  be positive  or negative,  depending  on whether  the  movement  in
Zi  is due  to the  a change  in the  average  price  of a service  or a change  in
the  average  number  of services  in  a  Hong  Kong  good  relative  to a  US good.  For38
example, Zi  may  be negatively  correlated  with  PitUs  if the  greater Zi
is,  the  poorer  is the  quality  of  US goods  relative  to  Hong  Kong  goods;  and  Zi
is  positively  correlated  with  Pi.HK  because  the  greater Zi  is,  the  better
is the  quality  of  Hong  Kong  goods  relative  to domestically-produced  goods,  and
the  high3r  will  be the  Hong  Kong  price.  If thlis  is  the  case,  both  effects  work
to  bias the  estimate  of  p  downward  in  Equation  (1),18  thus  creating  an
impression  of rent  sharing.  Furthermore,  we can  expect  a negative  correlation
between  Zi  and  Vit  --  it has been shown19 that more restrictive quotas
tend to induce  imports  of  a higher  quality,  since  quotas  are typically  volume,
rather  than  value  restrictions.  Therefore,  the  omission  of  Zi  would  cause
the  estimate  of  0  in  regression  (1)  to  be biased  downward.  There  is  no clear
relation  between  quality  differences  and  licence  concentration  or quota
utilization,  so that  we have  no prior  expectation  as to the  effect  on the
coefficients  on  Hit  and  Uit  caused  by the  omission  of  Zi.
There  are two  ways to  control  for  the  unmeasurable  "fixed  effects",  Z;.
One  way is to  make  use  of our  panel  data to  con.truct  "within"  estimators  of
the  regression  parameters  ir.  equation  (9).  A simpler  way,  however,  is to
introduce nine apparel group-specific intercepts, D1,..., Dg, in the matrix of
explanatory  variables:
(10)  Pit  H  al0 +  alDl +  +  aD9  +  a'Pitus  + r'Hit + 6'Uit  + 0Vit
+ (it
Note that  the  coefficient  O'  now  stands  for  the  marginal  component  of
rent  sharing  net  of the  effect  of product  differentiation.  The  constant  term
aCl is  exactly  (a'+rZ 10)  and  the  coefficients  on  the  apparel  group  dummies,
ai,  represent f(Zi-Zlo) for i-1,...,9.
Table  5  gives  the  results  of regression  (10).  The  estimate  of '  is39
TABLE 5
RESULTS  FOR  THE  FIXED  EFFECTS  MJODEL  (EOUATION  10)
Dependent variable - PitHK
Independent
Variables  Coefficient  t Statistic
Constant  -14.3210  -1.7299b
(8. 2786)
Di  -4.3106  1.2107
(3.5604)
D2  5.0287  1.0658
(4.7184)
D3  4.3467  1.1554
(3.7622)
D4  5.5429  2.7930a
(1.9846)
D5 1.7295  0.7839
(2.2062)
D5  2.3468  0.6229
(3.7679)
D7  -- 5.0124  -1.2716
(3.9417)
'D8  4.9452  1.1367
(4.3505)
Dq  -2.3575  -0.5155
(4.5728)
PitS  us0.8482  6 . 5593a
(0.31293)
Hit  0.2167  1.0023
(0.2163)
Uit  0.0506  3.4898a
(0.00145)
Vit  0.1732  x 10-7  0.6910
(0.2506  x  10-7
R2 - 0.9588,  Adjusted R2 - 0.9500
Number of observations - 75
* Standard  errors  are in  brackets  beneath  the  estimates  of the  parameters.
a Significant  at the  1  per cent  level.
b Significant  at the  10 per  cent  level.
Result  of  hvRothesis-testing:
t-statistic  for  test  of HO:P'-l  vs  Hl:p'<I:
t - -1.1742  reject  the  null  hypothesis  at the  20 per  cent level.
F-statistic  for  test  of
F - 3.9824  reject  the  null  hypothesis  at the  1  per  cent level.40
0.85,  which  is  higher  than  the  estimated  value  of 0.53 found  in  regression
(1).20  However,  a test  of the  null  hypothesis  that  6'-l  and  r'-6'-M'-O
jointly  can  be rejected  at the  1  per  cent  level,  and  a simple  t-test  of
whether f'  is equal to one against the alternative hypothesis that f'  is less
than  one  can  be rejected  at the  20 per  cent  significance  level.  In  other
words,  a significant  price  differential  between  Hong  Kong imports  and  US-
produced  apparel  exists  which  cannot  be explained  by the  fact  that  the  two
products  may  not  be identical.  We conclude  that  rent  sharing  is the  most
likely  explanation  for  the  difference. 21
Note  also  that,  as anticipated,  the  estimate  of  0'  given  in  Table  5
exceeds  that  of  X  given  in  Table  1. In fact,  the  introduction  of quality
differences  changes  the  direction  of the  effect  of quota  size  on  PHK,
although  O'  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero.
The intercepts (a'+fZi) for  i-l,...,10  are shown  in  Table  6. These
include  both the  fixed  component  of rent  sharing  and  the  fixed  effect  of
quality  differences  and  there  is  no way  we can  distinguish  between  the  two
effects.  In fact,  it is  possible  that  the  "fixed  effects"  we omitted  in
regression  (1)  represented  not  quality  differences  but  differences  in  the
fixed  component  of rent  sharing.  The  introduction  of "fixed  effects"  therefore
does  not  destroy  our  earlier  results  --  at  worst,  the  marginal  component  of
rent  sharing  is less  substantial  than  that  obtained  from  regression  (1),  but
it is significant  nonetheless;  at best,  the  apparel  groups  have different
fixed  components  of rent  sharing  and  our  earlier  results  are  strengthened.41
TABLE 6
INTERCEPTS CALCULATED  FROM  TABLE 5











8.  Determinants  of the  US-Hong  Kong  Price  Differential
Our results  thus far  have  established  that there  is  a distinct  gap
between  the  US price  of apparel  and the  license-inclusive  Hong  Kong price.
Furthermore,  this  price  differential  cannot  be explained  by time-invariant
quality  differences,  nor can  it  be explained  by the  aggregation  of our  data.
In  this  section,  we look  directly  at the  potential  determinants  of that  gap.
We regress  the  price  difference  between  imports  from  Hong  Kong and
domestically  produced  apparel  on a constant,  the  nine apparel  group  dummies,
the  numbers  equivalent,  the  utilization  rate,  the  quota  level  and  a new
variable,  Ait,  which  represents  the  share  of airflown  goods  in  the  total  value
of imports  of apparel  group  i from  Hong  Kong:
(11)  Pit  '  Pit  - a1o  +  alDl  +  *--  a9Dg  +  bHit  +  cUit  +  dVit  +  eAit
+ Eit-
A priori,  following  the  same  reasoning  provided  in-Section  5,  we should
expect  to see  a  negative  coefficient  on the  utilization  rate,  Uit; a positive
coefficient  on the  quota  level, Vit;  and  either  a positive  or negative
coefficient  on the  numbers  equivalent,  Hit,  depending  on the  extent  to  which
license  holders  can  exercise  monopoly  power  relative  to the  search  cost
associated  with fragmentary  holdings.
The  variable Ait  is introduced  as a proxy  for  the  ratio  of "fashion
items"  in total  imports.  A frequently-proffered  explanation  for  the  price
differential  between  imports  and  domestic  apparel  is that  imports  of these
fashion  items  involve  a greater  risk  because  of the longer  response  time  lag
compared  to  domestic  manufacturing  -- the  exporter  has to  bear this  risk  cost
by charging  a  PitHK  lower  than  PitUS. If this  story  were true,  then  we
would  expect  to see  a  positive  coefficient  on  Ait  in the  above  regression.43
Table  7 gives  the  results  of regression  (11).  The fourteen  independent
variables,  capturing  the  effects  of quality  differences,  license  holding
concentration,  quota  size,  quota  utilization  ratio  and fashion  risk,  explain
some  90  per cent  of the  variation  in  the  price  differential.  The intercept  is
substantial  -- almost $14 --  and it is statistically significant at the 20
per cent  level.  The  quota  utilization  rate is significant  at the  1  per cent
level  --  all  else  constant,  a 10  per  cent increase  in the  utilization  rate
closes  the  price  gap  by about  $0.50.  As rationalized  earlier,  a  high quota
utilization  rate,  all  else  constant,  makes  import  licenses  more  scarce;  this
drives  up the  license  price,  which  in turn  drives  up the  Hong Kong  price.  The
coefficient  on the  numbers  equivalent  is  negative  but  not significant. The
coefficient  on the  quota  level  is inexplicably  negative,  although  it,  too, is
not  significant.
The effect  of the  fashion  proxy  appears  to  be the  opposite  of  what was
expected.  Note that  fashion  items  may  also  be  better  quality  items.  For
example,  Yeung  and  Taylor  (1989)  conclude  from  their  survey  of  Hong Kong
apparel  manufacturers  that:  "From  the  buyer's  point  of  view,  more fashionable
items  denoted  special  quality  consideration.  J.C. Penney,  Sears  and  The  Gap
demand  high  quality." 20 The apparel  group  dummies  capture  these  fixed  quality
effects,  so that  the  fashion  proxy  represents  the  risk  effect  alone.  This  risk
effect  turns  out to  be insignificant.  The "risk"  story  may  not  be applicable
to  Hong  Kong  anyway.  since  the  Hong  Kong  apparel  manufacturers  pride
themselves  on their  adaptability  and  quick  response  to  market  changes.44
TABLE  7
REGRESSION  RESULTS  (EOUATION  11)
Dependent variable - Pit  - PitHK
Independent
Variables  Coefficient*  t  Statistic
Constant  13.7440  1.4082c
9.7598)
Di  4.1605  0.2225
(18.7030)
D2  3.8655  0.2218
(17.4300)
D3  -3.6455  -0.8407
(  4 .3362)
D4  -2.1629  -0.3494
(  6.1910)
D5 0.4719  0.2045
2.  3078)
D6 1.3741  0.4744
2.8965)
D7  10.6300  1.9927b
(5.3345)
DQ,  -1.3109  -0.2313
(5.6677)
D9 -2.9364  0.9366
(6.  4310)
Hit  -0.1363  -0.6278
(  0.2172)
Uit  -0.0510  -3,2838a
(  0.0155)
Vit  -0.1243  x 10-7  -0.4962
(  0.2505  10-7)
Ait  -11.7490  -0.3516
(33.4170)
R2  0.9137,  Adjusted R2 - 0.8953
Number of observations - 75
*  Standard  errors  are in  brackets  beneath  the  estimates  of the  parameters.
a Significant  at the 1  per  cent level.
b Significant  at the  10  per  cent  level.
c  Significant  at the  20  per  cent  level.45
9. Conclusions
Our  main objective  in this  paper  was to  develop  ways  of testing  the
hypothesis  of perfect  competition  everywhere  in  the  quota-restrained  market
for  apparel.  We examined  a  broad  implication  of this  hypothesis  in  the light
of  US clothing  imports  from  Hong  Kong,  specifically  that if  the  hypothesis
were true  and the  products  homogeneous,  then  the  Hong  Kong  price  inclusive  of
the license  price  and  adjusted  for tariffs  and  transportation  costs,  should
equal  the  US price,  The two  prices  may  deviate  if there  exists  monopsony  power
in the  market  for  apparel,  which  may  or may  not  be combined  with some  kind  of
market  power in  the  license  market.  Noting  that  siwple  product  market  power  is
not  sufficient  to generate  this  difference,  we were  careful  to distinguish
between  "rent  appropriation"  by product  market  power  and "rent  sharing",  which
arises  because  of market  power  on the  part of the  buyers.  Rent appropriation
affects  the  potential  license  price  which  is the  difference  in the  US price
and the  Hong  Kong  price,  adjusted  for  tariffs  and  transport  costs  but
exclusive  of the  license  price.  Rent  sharing  determines  the  distribution  of
these  potential  rents  between  the  license  owners  and the  buyers.
We found  significant  evidence  of rent  sharing  in the  data  we collected
on ten  apparel  groups.  Recognizing  that  this  could  be due  to compositional
differences  in  US production  compared  to Hong  Kong  exports,  we developed  a way
of testing  for the  existence  of such  differences.  We did  not find  these
differences  to  be significant  on the  whole.  We also  attempted  to incorporate
some  notion  of  product  differentiation  and found  that  this  did  not entirely
close  the  gap  between  the  US and  Hong  Kong  prices.
Our  work gives  some support  for  the  existence  of buying  power in the
quota-constrained  market  for  apparel  imports  from  Hong  Kong together  with some46
market  power  in  the  license  market.  Now  Hong  Kong is  probably  the  one  case
most likely  to  satisfy  the  assumption  of perfect  competition.  Even  here,
however,  this  assumption  does  not  seem to  hold.  This  casts  some  doubt  on the
prevailing  practice  of assuming  perfect  competition  everywhere  in empirical
work on the  MFA. Based  on the  prices  of quota  licenses  in  Hong  Kong,  current
estimates  of the  quota  premium  are  as high  as 25  per  cent  of total  export
value.  Our  results  suggest  that  even these  figures  may  be too  small,  as some
15-50  per  cent  of the  rent is  retained  in the  US.  The implication  is that the
overall  welfare  cost imposed  by the  MFA  on exporting  countries  may  be even
heavier  than  initially  feared  --  besides  the  acknowledged  reduction  in trade
volume,  these  countries  are  not  receiving  the  full  amount  of their  quota  rent.
It is  worth  emphasizing  that  we have  not  addressed  the  issue  of testing
for  product  market  power,  which  is the  focus  of much  of the  theoretical  work
in  the  area,  but have focused  on a new  angle  that  is  emphasized  in the trade
press,  namely,  the  issue  of rent sharing.  It is  possible  to test  for  product
market  imperfections  by essentially  looking  at their  consequence,  i.e.  the
existence  of price-cost  margins.  This  can  be done  using  calibration  or
computable  partial  equilibrium  models  as done  by Dixit  (1988),  Krishna,  Hogan
and  Swagel  (1989)  and  Baldwin  and  Krugman  (1988)  among  others.  Alternatively,
fully-specified  econometric  models  of the  industry  can  be estimated.  However,
data  requirements  for  such  models often  cannot  be met  as available
information  is limited  and  cost  estimates  are  hard to  obtain.  It is likely
that  work along  the  lines  of Mody  et al. (1990a,  1990b)  will  help in  obtaining
the  cost  data  needed.
We chose  not to focus  on product  market  imperfections  here as  there  are
a large  number  of suppliers  in the  apparel  market.  In the  future,  we hope to47
extend  our  work in three  directions.  Firstly,  we plan to extend  the  scope  of
our study  to include  other  developing  countries  in order  to provide  further
insights  and to check  the  generality  of our  results.  Secondly,  we intend  to
study  US apparel  trade  with non-restricted  countries  as  well to see if  price
differentials  also  exist  which  cannot  be explained  by quality  differences  --
if such  price  differentials  are  observed,  then  our finding  of rent  sharing  in
the  MFA  could  instead  simply  be an indication  of the  absence  of purchasing
power  parity.  Thirdly,  we plan to examine  license  price  paths  themselves  to
test  for  allegations  of price  fixing  in  explicitly  dynamic  settings.  Work on
these  areas  should  considerably  enhance  our  understanding  of  how these  markets
function  and the  proper  assumptions  to  make in  evaluating  the  effects  of the
KFA  as well  as proposed  reforms.48
END  NOTES
1.See,  for  example,  the  papers  contained  in Hamilton  (1990)  which analyze  the
effects  of the  MFA and  its  proposed  reforms  from  a  variety  of viewpoints.
2.Morkre  (1984)  p. 2.
3.He dismissed the suggestion  of quota monopolization  on the basis of two
observations.  Firstly,  he found  no evidence  of concentration  in quota  holdings
among the top four firms in 10 product  categories  in 1980. (However,  he did
acknowledge  that this evidence  may not be definitive  because there may be
ownership  links  between  different  quota  holders.)  Secondly,  the  quota  utilization
rates  in  1980  were  found  to  exceed  100  per  cent  for  all  but  one  category,  whereas
monopolization  of quotas  would  be expected  to  result  in short-shipping.
The  first  observation  is  not  consistent  with the  data  we  have,  which  show
high  degrees  of concentration  in  certain  categories  like  men's  wool  coats (MFA
category  434)  and  cotton  woven  shirts  (MFA  category  340).  The  second  observation
is not relevant  because the implementation  of the restraint  system creates
incentives  for  quota  holders  to  use  up all  their  licenses.
4.On  the  other  hand,  if they  own  some  licenses,  then  this  incentive  is tempered
as they  take  into  account  the  value  of their  license  holdings.
5.There  may  be  domestic  competitive  supply  in  which  case  the  monopolist's  demand
in  what follows  should  be interpreted  as the  residual  demand  curve.
6.Similar  results  can  be shown  to  go  through  for  oligopsony.  See  Krishna  and  Tan
(1990).
7.The  two  prices  may not  be separated  by exactly  the license  price for other
reasons  as  well.  These  include  factors  such  as unmeasured  costs  created  by the
quota  and  licensing  system  itself.  For  examS'e,  if  it  is  hard to  get  through  the
paperwork  and bureaucracy  imposed  by the implementation  system  or to obtain
licenses,  then  the  difference  between  the  demand  and  supply  prices  will  exceed
the  license  price.  Thus,  no test  of  whether  the  two  prices  are  separated  by the
license  price (plus  any  tariff  and  transport  costs  that  apply)  will  be entirely
clear  about  the  cause  of the  difference.  Also, the  absence  of this  difference
does  not  rule  out  market  power  on the  supply  side  as argued  earlier,  so it  does
not imply  competitive  supply.
8.This  is not an unreasonable  assumption  for the  license  holder  because  quota
licenses  are  product-  and  country-specific  so  that  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement
with the monopsonist,  the exporter  does not have the option  of selling  his
licenses  elsewhere.
9.The reference  period  is usually  the most recent  12-month  period for  which
shipment  performance  can be ascertained  prior to the introduction  of the
restraint.
l0.In  the  case  of  finished  piece-goods,  quotas  are  allocated  on a  40/30/30  basis
among  the  exporter,  the  finisher  and  the  weaver.  In  the  case  of finished  fabrics
manufactured  using  imported  grey  fabrics,  quotas  are  allocated  on a 50/50  basis
to the  exporter  and the  finisher.49
ll.This  amount  was  reduced  to 35  per  cent  in  June  1985,  but  was  changed  back  to
50  per  cent in  July  of the  following  year.
12.Textile  Asia,  March  1989.
13.Goto  (1989)  p. 21 8.
14.It  is  possible  that  other  cost  factors  associated  with the  quota  system  may
account  for  part of this  margin.  See  endnote  7.
15.We  make this assumption  both for simplicity  and in order to keep as many
degrees  of freedom  as possible  given  our  data  limitations.
16.Ideally,  we would  like  to  be able  to  estimate  a simultaneous  equation  system
based  on Armington's  (1969)  model.
17.In  fact,  we can  decompose Zit  into  a fixed  effect  and two  other  components
which  vary over  time:
- HK  - qUS)  +  (sitq,tHK  - - U  - -H  U
Zi  s  (qHK  qUS  si~  s  qHK  - (sitqitU  - ijqi  5)
- irZi  + lrlZlit  + 'r2Z2iz,
'x,  1  and  2  are  constants; si  is  the  average  price  of  a service  from  good
i  over  the  eight  years: qiHK  is  the  average  number  of services  in  a  Hong  Kong-
produced  good i over the eight  years;  and  qiUS  is the average  number of
services  in a US- roduced  good i over the  eight  years.  The fixed  effect,  Zi
is  equal  to si(qj  K - qiUs)'>  or  (I/m)  times  the  average  US-Hong  Kong  quality
difference; Zlit  - (sitqit  siqi  )/l,  or  (1/if)  times  the  deviation  of
Hong  Kong  quality  from  its  average  value;  and  Z2it  - -(sitqit - siqi )/w 2,
or  (11w)  times  the  deviation  of  US quality  from  its  average  value
The "true" equation,  taking into account  quality differences,  should
actually  be:
(9)  PitHK  _  a  +  'itUs + r'Hit  + 6'Uit  +  O'Vit  + fZi  + WlZlit  + lr 2Z2it
+  it.HKu
Note  that Zlit is  positively  correlated  with  both  PitS  and Pit:  a  higher
Zlit  implies  a better  Hong Kong  quality  relative  to the  average  and  hence,  a
higher  Hong  Kong  price;  a  higher Zlit could  reflect  a  higher  price  of  a  service
relative  to  the  average,  in  which  case  we would  observe  also  a  'higher  US price.
Similarly,  Z2it  is negatively  correlated  with both  PitHK  and  PitUS.
Consequently,  the  omission  of  Zlit ani  Z2it will result  in  an upward-biased
0  in  Equation  (1).
18.This  follows  directly  from  the  formula  for  omitted  variable  bias.  Suppose  the
true  model  is:
y  - xv  +  u,  *  2
with E(u)  - 0 and  E(uu')  - o2I,  and  the  misspecified  model  is:
y  - X3 p +  U,
where  Xi is  a subset  of  X,  X - [Xl X2].  X 1 contains  the  first  r  variables  of
X, omitting  the remaining  (k-r)  variables.  Then b, the  estimated  coefficient
vector  from  the  misspecified  model,  is  such  that:
E(b)  -(Xi'X1)  lX  X
Thus:
E(bi)  -i  + ai,r+l1r+l  +  . + ai,kh,  i-l.,,,.r,
where  ai r+l,...,ai,k  are  the  elements  in the  ith  row  of (X12x1) 1XlX'X 2.
See  Johnston  (1985)  p.260.50
19.See  Rodriguez  (1979).
20.The  estimate  of 0.85  is  probably  biased  upward  due to  our  omission  of  Zli
and  Z2it  (See  endnote  19.) Even so, as mentioned  in the text,  a t-test  or
whether P'-1 can  be rejected  at the  20  per  cent  level.  It  would  appear,  then,
that  despite  our "bending  over  backwards"  to incorporate  quality  differences  in
the  model,  there  is  still  a  portion  of  the  US-Hong  Kong  price  differential  which
may  be attributed  to rent-sharing.
21.This  is subject  to the  same  reservations  as discussed  in  endnote  14.
22.Yeung  and  Taylor  (1989),  p. 207.51
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DATA APPENDIX
1.  Data Sources  and Product  GrouR  Definitions
The  data  utilized  in this  study  cover  the  time  period  1981  to 1988  and
pertain  to three  broad  areas:  domestically-produced  apparel;  imported  apparel
from  Hong  Kong;  and licenses  for  apparel  imports  from  Hong Kong.
The quantity  and  value  of apparel  produced  in the  US were obtained  from
Current  Industrial  Reports  published  by the  US Department  of Commerce,  Bureau
of the  Census.  The  statistics  in  these  publication  are  based  on surveys  of all
known  manufacturers  and  jobbers  (except  the  very small  firms  excluded  from  the
scope  of the  survey)  and  represent  total  U.S.  production  of most  major
garments. 1 We assume  that  all  domestic  production  is  consumed  domestically,
i.e.  domestic  production  equals  sales  to the  home  market.  This is  not
unreasonable  sinr.e  the  proportion  of domestic  apparel  production  exported
overseas  is relatively  small  (less  than  ten  per  cent in  general.)
The  quantity  of  apparel  imports  from  Hong  Kong  as  well as quota
utilization  ratios  were  obtained  from  Expired  Performance  Re2orts  issued  by
the  US Department  of Commerce,  Office  of Textiles  and  Apparel.  The  value  of
Hong  Kong imports  was  obtained  from  a special  computer  run  using  US IM-145
Import  Trade  tapes  at the  US Department  of Commerce,  Office  of  Textiles  and
Apparel.  The  value  of imports  used is  in terms  of customs  value,  which is
generally  defined  to  be the  price  actually  paid or  payable  for  merchandise
when it is  sold  for  exportation  to the  US, excluding  US import  duties,
freight,  insurance,  and  other  charges  incurred  in  bringing  the  merchandise  to
the  US. 2
Data on  US apparel  production  is  classified  according  to  Standard
Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  codes.  Imports  of restrained  textiles  andii
apparel,  however,  are  classified  according  to  the  MFA  categories  of the  US,
which  in tu-;n  are  groupings  of seven-digit  Tariff  Schedule  of the  US (TSUSA)
categories.  Concordance  tables  are  available  which  link  the  SIC codes  with the
TSUSA  classification  but there  is  no straightforward  mapping  between  the  SIC
and  MFA  classification  systems.  The  MFA  categories  classify  the  different
types  of apparel  by fabric  type  e.g.  cotton,  wool  and  manmade  fiber.  The SIC
categories,  on the  other  hand,  classify  apparel  as  men's,  boys',
women's/misses'/juniors'  and  girls'/children's/infants,  with further
subdivisions  according  to  fabric  type.  Quantity  figures  are  sometimes  printed
for  certain  fabric-type  subdivisions,  but  value  figures  are  not  available.
Moreover,  the  coverage  of the  individual  SIC  categories  has changed  many times
over  the  years  considered  (1981  - 1988).
Faced  with these  complications,  we had to rearrange  the  data  into  new
(larger)  groups  ccmprising  several  SIC  and  MFA categories,  such  that there  was
minimal  overlap  between  the  categories  across  groups.  We defined  ten such
groups:  (1)  dresses,  (2)  skirts,  (3)  playsuits,  (4)  sweaters,
(5)  trousers,  (6)  men's  coats,  (7)  women's  coats,  (8)  woven  shirts,  (9)  knit
shirts,  and (10)  underwear.
As a convenient  intermediate  step  to  keep the  US production  data fairly
consistent  over  the  eight  years,  we first  assembled  the  SIC categories  of
similar  items  by:  men's/boys'  outerwear;  women's/girls'/infants'  outerwear;
men's/boys'  nightwear  and  underwear;  and  women's/girls'/infants'  nightwear  and
underwear.  Appendix  Table  1 lists  the  production  groupings  and their  component
SIC  categories  and  Appendix  Table  2 shows  the  relation  between  these
groupings,  the  MFA  categories  and the  ten  apparel  groups.APPEIII l]AUE  I  eoittnilaad
RELATION  EKTEEN  OIW  P  IUCIIOU  .WIhIS  AN THE  SIC  CATERIES
U5 PrudlUttic Cateoles  (SIC  Coon)  US  Pruicti=  C&tWIReS  (SIC  Ctii)
Preductio  k  p  uui  C  hi cripltu  1`1  & 1937  1961  1  1965
IISIEIIS,  HlIS  R  IFIIIS  AITAUEL
36) Brisus  233530o  Nisljr  drnsns  23353W0  Iln/jr  irnses
2361510  6/cin dressn  2361146  I/sUotealtsem  irnsn
2361170  Ile drnsn  236150  Cho  rim
2311360  l.d  rsses
2361270  lt  irnse
31) Suits  Mn patsmltsi
32) iveralls, cEvealls aW JuapSaits  *
33) gmem  him  s  mi  shirts  2331400  Ni/s/jr  *nv  blousn C sirts  23317W  VUn/jr mu hUles  I  srts
261400  6/chi sow  hlosses  & sdrtm  236131U  lsdtlmultm  mot liesn  6 sgrts
236440  Irl  mo bllesn  tI  srts  2361320  CMtuied  WV  himon  b mrts
23I330 lbE mw  blusn  I  srts
341 IT-hirts  ad  tool ttps  for  itwrmei  2331320  Ilnljr  km  t  It taik  for  mter ir  JKc  lu-SI  t  23323 IUn/sJr km  t I  tas  for mterir  aIc 1mg-IV  t
2361301  6/cih to t-sdrts I  tmittps  231426  6/c/htied  -shrts I  tauktips
35) All other klt  shirts  n  tmatihrts  2331330  ims/ljr all  othr  km  mArts o  matshrts  2331310  I/mm/r  kb fuall/a  opm frot  lmues  I  t  rts
2363N Ut6/c all  ctRw km  bsrts  2331336  U/u/jr  all  other km  ts
2361330  li)  ki bhlms  I. srts  2361616  6/timtcd  km  fhil/pWt  am  trot  bloosn  Ii  *ts
236136  6tIhaltid all stlir  m  sdrtt  Itt  satmirts
2361406  lie  ki  hblesn  I  sArts
361  Sweaters  2  3397A0  N/snjr  plloewr suates  23976 Illn/jr  pullmwr smtes
2369330  6/c.  meaters  239736  l  ijr  cst  *  cari  smiters
2369311S  lnJ smatws  236 13 6/S/coiE  meters  i  smater  sts
371  Coatl ii  caps,  n  ism,  ran,  fIr  or  lathier  2331110  U/mI/jr cotl  b  capn  sE ifmthrletera  233110  U/n/jr  cuts  I  capn  c  ic ,ENtii,h,lmtur,ra
IiK  girls  aid  malst  a  Jacets  aMd  sM  amiaSi  2369201  6/chi heuv  coats, Itls  C6 ummits  236261  6/rho/id cuts,  jits I  smuits
239205  6/ciM light  coats  t  ;kls
2369270  1se  cots,  jits  I soeiaits
U)  halwed  sait-typ  jackets  2337470  4  mIl/jr up  ailored  wit  type jkts  2337476  II/n/)r  p tailorei  suit  typ  Pts
39) N  t-le  raerd  wter  jaclets, n  ski  23374U0  Ui/n/jr  nritalorid  outer lkts  m ski  233740  Wan/jr mtailwed  mit rits  en sk
WI)  Vnts S
41) hai  aieatlhr-fllid  jaciets lo  m  jrs'li
42) binmuts  Ioua  I ju'  26020  U/mi/r raiNEoDls  235020  I/rn/jr  ratiKcats
43) Smoalsirts  2331340  I/msi/r  sueatihrts  2331240  IUIn/jr  swmtskrts
2361305  U/c6il  swetsirts
44) Swat pats  2339760  I/ss/sr  st  pants  23370 I/r/pr  wmt  paits
23MM1  6/ct.n sp seat  pants  2391fO  6/cim/ltd su  mwt pants
45) Joggung  suits  2339760  U/ms/jr  are-up  o  jiging  suits  2339760  1/n/jr  wore-V ei  r  joiog  suilt
23693KA  6/cia  joqgsq saits  23631K  6/ca/imf  j3ii  wits
46) Smaestsi
47) Ski  Witts  aid -rets  Imsan I  is')  23391770  UI/s/jr  ski jits  inc ski vsts  2339773  I/n/ir  ki  jits  IK ski vnsts
4*) Ski seats I_ese I  urs'  )
49) Ski pats  Issus  I  Jirsl  2339775  UMis/jr ski pats  23n3775  I/Imjr  ski pais
56) 'mdy  suite  miii  I  jrs l
511 Sbets  23397CO  OlIs/jr  shorts  Int  391i  i  t lit,i  2339X7C  Mi  jir  srts  asc jo"gi  I tults
236934  6/cmn  shirts  239140  C/1s  tes/tlnm  shrts
236921J  Cio'mf  OdartsWfE12 TABLE  I
IELUIIOU  KIOEl  -OA  IUCriul  lWItS  m  IE  SIC  CIAEIES
US Pradiectam  Cat  agrtos  ISIC  Cadni  US  PradKcti CatOWarn1  ISIC  Car)
Prsdction kr_ma  ad  DKcrmptsm  11  & 17  h1  *  11I
IEU  S AN BOS AP9EL
11 Casl,  amtamlored  sport cutst
21  Sits  iscl.  ua feresa
31  Ivrcats,  topcoats,  cm coats,  mic  aiforas  2311200  N  overcts, topcts I tail  sibunrhba  It car cts mac  usat  2311260  N evercts, tPEcts  I  tInl  SarWha  I  car cts ic  uif
2311400  ov*rcts, tapcts  I tail  surbhm t  car cts  aKc 10f  231110  B evarcts.  tapts  I tail  sdwbm  I car CtS  c  IK  if
4)  Iaiac"ts,  sKc  uifore  2365150  Pil  ratincets  sac  uanifrm  2315154  Nil raincoats nc maalmr
5)  Tailoed  suit-type  dress aid sport cats,  IKc  waI-er
61  Separate vnts etc svnter  vestsa
11 tes  dross  and  basis.ss  siarts,  sac sailers  2321610  N ev  drns I  busins  srts  sac waif  2521110  N  - dress  I b*sios  Arts  aK uSa#
2321*30  5  wow  shrts  isc  dress  I  mail  2321430  1Sw  sndrts  Iac drss  I manf
1  Meves  sport  shirts  2321*20  A wow  spwrt  shirts  2321*26  f WV  rt  shmrts
9)  I-shirts  and tank tops for  starear  2321320  N t & tank far oateruear  mic lag-slv  t  2321720 t I  tak  for  stwrwar mK  e.g-sly t
2321350  t  I  tas  tr  autw  r_r  m t lg-siw  t  2321751 It  tab  fwr  terer  ma leg-sly i
101  All other knit shirts,  It  seatshirts  2321301  I/  all  athw km  slarts a  aeatisrts  2521516  I  b  hailipart  me  trat  shrts e  siat*rts
2321740 k  h  la  i/part  apes  frmt  isrt  a  s  tsWts
2M210  l  all  otw  ks shrts a  sw  sats
lis  Simeaters,  weater vests, knit  cardiass an  pullswrs  23293fO  I  saters  ac swater vests, kint cardms  I pullovers  23291  0  tswars  imc  sweter vts,  bift  cadas 6 pellevrs
2329360  *  waters  ac  satr  vests, brat cardis I pllowans  23293 I sweats  mKc  Seat8r VMts, bait  cardis I  pullov1rs
12) Ire.  and pirt  trousers, imc  amifars  2325110  NSep  dres a sport trasies  lot waifra  23271611  st  dress  I  Sport  traurs  mac  wamfora
2325130 sup  drns I  sport trausaws  inc uniform  232710  5  up  dress  I sWrt trousers sm uamform
131  Jeans  ad  diaree  2325210  I  )"a  I dgare  23"  m  11  _m  I _weas
2325230 jas  Idngaree  "  s  23SU3  I  5N  I  d_ea
14) Caul  slacks  2325220  N jeaa-cat  casual  slacks  23233  11j  wcut  casul  slacks
23252130  Inaa-cut  casl  slacks  233U3 S  jeaa-cat  caual  slacks
15 Shuts  2329310  I  Nsrts  Ic  athletic shorts  221C  I  sorts 1  athletic  shrts
2329320 shorts mac  athletic  orts  23271E0  I  ots  nK athletic  horts
1lln  Nal  mtailored  muter  lack1ts  jitski,  23210 N  kVY  atai  ett  jhtSn  b  Ski  Ia  wif  I pdd  Jits  2291101 oba heVy  atalrerd  eter  jkttS  n  Ski lu  lif
nt  padded  vnts  2329190  *  nontall bhy mater )tts  n ski  ma padded  fit  vests  23291" g  aetaulwread  havy mtetr jits  e  ski
229110  Il/  pladed  Jtt  vets  I cuot vsts
II)  Light meatailered  mter  jackets  2329330  1 light  atamlwrd  uter  jikts  2329YA  Inss  light  mtailwrd  mter  1btS  isc emf
23293103  *atalwed  ligtt  mter  ibIs  232C  le"'  intamlored light  eter  jhts
I1l  -I  ad  leather filled  aiets  and  vestse
191  Sweatemrts  23213170  Il  satrts  23227 11N  eat rts
20  Set  paat  2329380  N/B  swatpats  23293 lug  U  at  ts
211  Jsging  suits  232930 Il/ awvep  or Jaggag  suits  23290 4US w  or  waggn  suits
221  Somer
23) S  hi  jkets  ad  vests  2329350  fIl/ ski  ihts ic  ski vests  2290  1S si  tjit  Ic  Skl vnts
241  Sk  ptS  2329355  Il  ski pants  23292 WI ski pants
251  s  its  and overalls'
2*)  rk  pats  252*210  N ort  pats  231011  _k  pnts
273  Covealls,  aralls  ad .ws,mJ  tss
23)  thr  shirts lel  kuiti  232*100  N/U  ver  shirts  233100  IB  S  k shirts
29) Overall  JA  rUk-tp jackets  232*20 Il/  averall Iork  type jkts  2334  W  oerall  P _*rW  tp  jktsAPthlIII TAKE  I (ceetiuwedl
hELAhIS  *TVEN OUR  P  IUtIWN SWIMS  M  ltE  SIC  CATEIWES
US Prodactiot Catigrats  (it  Ct  id  uS  Padutam  Catewm s  SIC Codes,
PrhdKtat  rupipq  af  d  ricaptas  9W  11  I"  1907  1&  iI
IENS  S 303  ININEIII -O  tMM
551  Pajmast  d sIer  rptear.
IA)  hi...
571  I  hirts  2322130  1 lalhtwar  ushrtts  n  t-s  rts  for  lutermear  2322130  I  libhtmmr  aitrts  n  t-  kts  for  aterrm
2322140  3 li,tmgt  vadihrts n  t-s  rts  fer  eester.ar  232214W  B limt.gt  vairts  on t-s&rts  for  mtersaar
2Ytl2110  A saxes 21-4T  A 4-? ucdrahrts  & all  ether amdwcr  2322130  NIS slemel  athletic  type  tsbrts
Thrmal  Mh.rN
391  Knit briefs & sthrts  23221C0D  km  briefs  L ShortS  232210  N  to  briefs  A  shts
23221(03  km  briefs  I  sbWt  23221"9  km  briefs  A Awuts
Al) 1bu  heir  shorts  2322110  Hit vew  bor  shuts  2211  11 emm  hoer  shorts
2341260  3 si;es 21-41  1 4-7 medrpiats  2322121  m*  heor  shets
iSlNS.  SILS' AOS  UIIITS  361EU Mt111S1  UI  IENIM
t1)  Slips  2341210  Ale/ijr fmll-leeth  A  hallf  cila  2301210  Ul&iJ)r  fii  -Beqtb  slaps
2M4120  6  saen  7-1 slips  2541220  Wlteslr  half-slkps  to  pettipamts
23412[0  6  sizes  21-4 II  4-Al  slips  2141210  6lcbhmted  slaps
621  Panties  2341230  Nms/jir  pectie,  ac(  pettipaats  2341230  u/hi  pastim  s ta  pettpaets<
2341250  6 si  in  7-1 pmtin  IKc  petttpPantc  2341250  6lchelela paitin  tc  pttipats
2341230  6  sizes  21-4t I  4-Ul Wtin
131  lbsa  teats,  camiscis  It  thermals  2341240  Vtesljr  vtoa  taits, cmsalvs.  themal  udamr  etc  23124  Ctuti/  r  oaim  suts  camales.  tteral  _micr  Etc
(aKt  WO Wct,  paUticS,  sIlps I  NmairJalrtil  2341230  6  aizn 7-1 all  eter  _uuw  23412D  Sichmltcd  t-arts  vnts  thr _tW  ad r as petian
23412fO  6 scen  21-tl  I  A-A  a1l  etW  opiumr  23120  lot mrW  IK  pamtams,  SIPt  Ib  emduhtS
23412CO  Taf  madimar  IK  PaRtaS,  SlIPS  I  madcrtS
64) ghltgmism
(iIK  ma  girls  pa  s  & iniuats  beht clIthes)
AS)  pacama
66)  other  alatmwl
67)  Ran  a hem ctts'
Al)  Mrcsluw,  bralettes, mad  hLaede
2) hrdiesl
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RELEUhI  KT IEEU  DII PPUUCIII  IIOWIS6S  ANtIl[  SIC  CATEIIBIES
US ProA,ctmoe  Cateories  (SIC  Codesi  ttS  *oistiam  Catewga  r  SIC  Cub.s)
Pruductitarn  ompng  and kscriptiorn  2994  &  1113  292  I  1911
1INES,  EIILS  AN IwAiNs  M9(L
)  krnsn  se  23  11 ti/ssijr  dress"s  2351II  Vles/It  /jrress
2361121  6/sutee/tlem  dresws  231UI02I  6/stte  tmm drsss
2361123  Cho  resss  2361023  Cho  dress
2321125  Inf I  tad arese  2342025  IbJ & tud dresss
322  Suits  and  jsaetsiitis
321  Overalls, ceralls  and  jrnpsuits  a
332 lewe  blouses and  shirts  2331100  Il/stjr  ov blUouses  I  shrts  2332100  I/lrljr  bl  ne.  & starts liI(  tn fabric)
2361105  6/setmn/tet  vow  bloos  *  srts  231105 6/sutmte  blouses  & shnrts  tIs  kt  fabrit)
2342II4 Chin/iEf/td  utv bloses  I  s*  rts  2411114  Cs/lni./ted  bluss  I  rts  sic km fabric)
341  I-shrts  and  tank tops Icr ostervear I  233124S  Ui/s/jr  km blouses  L shirts  2313243  diaer  km utwrsar  set  skrts as  lsotwr  sbrts
1  262113  /s6ubteltueu  to  blosn I  shrls em  smatiirts  2341213 /subttueitum  km storumar sport  hrts  n  weatsrts
352 All  other knit  skirts  es  suaitsbirts  I  '231215  Ckn/itmf/tod  a blouesm  I  hrts  en setats rts  2  31215 Chin/alm  tod kn outermear  sport srts  rr  uatlrts
342  S.atrs  2255130  l/es/jr  sweaters  2'53130  t/msnJr suaters
2253110  6/cil  lf  sesaters  sIR sasater  nests  2253140  61che/lnf sueaters  inc sweater  vests
31) Coadts  and  capes.  cz down,  rain,  for  or  jeather  23117101  N/msijr coats I  capes  tic  dem,feathr,fur,leather,rais  2137100  U/os/jr  rts  L caprs etc for,leath,rain  ist  den  I  death
tioc girls  and  infants  jackets  sad  smoos6its)  2343113  6Wsubltee/teea  coats  en  dm  & oeathrw  23430123  6/subtee/tatt  coats
2343112  Crn/itf  coats  iRc  sets,  ski  suits  I  seousuits  2343012  Chn/&mf  Coats  el  coat &  I"9  sets
2343042  6/chn/lic/tld  sets, ski  smits I  snusits  -
Sol  Tailored  slit-type  Jackets  N.A.  .A. 
39)  No-tailored  outer  Jackets,  et  ski  2331420  l!os/jr  jackets  2337420  Ufes/ir  jackets 
2343129  6/chn/saf  Jackets  2363028  6/chafin/  jackets
402  Vests I
41)  Bu  and  feather-alIled  jackets  ludeen  I  jrs  I
42)  Lamouts  leoen  I  jrs'l  2395020  Uti/s/jr  raincoats  2385020  t/es/jr  rainosats
2035130  6/chn/tod raincoats  t  raicapes  2385030  6/chin/tad  raincoats  I  raincapes
432  Swatsbarts  2331245  igs/jlr  s.eatshrts  2331245  U/ms/jr  soeatshrts
252121S  6/chlin/  sueatshrts  23tl21S9  Bchin/lE  saatsh  rts
44) Seat pants  2133972  M/nsi/jr swat  pants  N.A
2369190  6/chn/tod  sep sweat pants
452 Jggintg  seuts  2339759  Wigssjr mar.-op or  joging  suits  2339759  U/rn/jr  oare-up  or  Jogglmn  suits
2369199 l/chn/iaf  joging  suits
462  Swimsuitsi
412  Ski jackets and  vests leoenn  hI jrs  l  2339702  N/sjtir  ski  jkts  Inc  ski  Vests  2339702  I/es/jr  ski  jts Jac  ski  Vests
462  Ski  suits  (sown I  grsm 
4SI  Ski  pats  loen  6  jrs  2  2139740  U/es/jr  ski  pants  2339140  U/es/jr  shi  pasts
51  body  smits  lto  n  &  jrs'  I
511  Shwrts  2339721  V/esijr  shorts inc  gaging  & teenis  2339721  U/ts/jr  mbets imc j. ggtn  I  t  ecis
2369101  61sulbteten'teem  shorts  2349101  C/s temittn  sborts
234171 Cm/ifnf shorts  2341071  Chin/at  OrtsAWPEOUh  I311  I  cantimvl
REULAION  0ItlEEt  MIt P  CTO  6IUU  SW1S  S  TItE  SIC  COTE6I01ES
US Production  Cateoris  tSIC Codes)  IS  Prudttim  Catwries  ISIC Cd")
Prictia  kaip  g aid  S  Esriptios  I"4  1 1  102 I  191l
tztl'S  M  MYS  W ^L
11  Camal,  mntailared  sport  coals#
21  Slits  iid.  atloresw
33 Overcants,  topcoats,  car  coats,  nc  unitfors  23112151  overlts,  topcts t  tail  uburban  I  car  is  ic unial  2311215  tt tverts,  teWts &  tail  subrbaon  t  car  Lts ic  mail
2311414  oercts,  toPCts  I  tail  Skurhban  I  Car  Eis  Ic veil  2311414  S e*vrcts,  tWcts  I  tail  svtuba  t  car  cits ic  vtt#
41  Aanmciats, iKc  uifor  2385041  Hit ramnceats  inc  unsfors  2385041  NIS  ralistts  tiw  tailors
SI  Tailored  suit-type  dress  an  sport  coats,  inc  uniforia
41 Sepaate  vnsts  *sc swater vnts
II  Mom  dress  and  business  skirt,s  tic  unifore  23'1411  t  dress t  busines  nrts  inc v  ii  (nnc kn fabricl  2321311  t  drs  It  &buins.  rts  in  moil  A  Kic ft  rindl
25:1451  0 nov silrts  ic  dress I  unif  23214531  0dress  iwts inc  vif  (inc km fAbricl
Sl  bvi  sport  shirts  2321407  N nov sport  skirts  23210  N  H  v wrt  riirts
2321451  S ow sport shirts
91  T-shirts  and tank tops for  outermear 
2321201  ktn  srt  Shirts en  seatskrts  2321201  N tk  sport  skirts  m watshrts
101  All other knit shirts,  tn  swetshirts  1  2321224  S  ki  sot  skirts  n  seatshrts  232122t4 ka ist  siirts  ea swatsbrts
11 Seaters,  smter  vests,  it  cka  irdigans  and  pulloves  2253105  R sweatwrs  inE snater  nsts,  knit  cads  I  pullovers  22505  Nsnaters  ZOE  SOaN  VveAS,  knit  cardiS  I  pIIovWrs
2253107  1  seatars  Im  nater  vnts,  tkat carls  &  pullovers  2253107  5 r_tera  w  iC  seater  vnts,  knit  cards  t  pnllvmrs<
122  Dress ad  sport Irounrs,  inc  wfor  S327111  * sop dres I  sport traers  nsc  maf ro  2327111  H inp drm  &  sprt  trauws  iot  vailtrls
1321157  1  sep  Crns t  sprt  trews  inc  aif re  2327157 Ysp  dress  & sport trfsrs  imc mlanwe
113  Jn  and  dgares  2125311  H jeans  It darem  23311D  HI  eas  t  imWren
232Bl41  B jeas a d_unarees  231341  S j1as & d_ug  s
141  Canl  slacks  2328321  H ja-cut  tasal  slacks  23323  UJose-cat caml slatks
2321351  0 jean-cut casual slacks  212351  Bjea-cut  casual slacks
1531  Shrts  232714 11  shrts  inc athletic  skrts  2327141  I  rsorts  an  athletic  shorts
2327161  I  sh  rto  in  athletic  shorts  2327161  S sort  a  athletic  hwrts
2329252  WI athletic  rts
It  tbavy  netilornerd  outer  jackets  ea  ski,  2327122  On's  heavy  mtale  red  eater  Jits  Sl  ski  tI  Vii  2129122  H  beavy  ntail eter  jits  en  sit  inc mnif
iMC pade vosts  2329125  lSoys  noitllored  hetvy  outer jits  as ski  2329125  0 mtail  heavy  euter lits  na  Ski
171  tight  untailormd  outr  jackirts  2M2925  Hen  s  light  noutailared  eater  jits  inc isnf  2329251  N light  *tail euter  jkts  inc sail
2329209  Boys'  ontallred  liht  eater jkts  232920  ntall  light  ntr  jkts
1I De  dad feather  filled  jackets and vest%'
19) Smataharts  2329219  2/5  snaetshrts  2329219  HIS  s  rtsits
203  Smet pats  2329253  N/1 smeatpants  2329  all  iatenta
211  Jigging  suits  232m9217  HlS warsp or joggia siits  23292771N  lmanp  'r  jaggiN suits
221  Seneas
233  Ski Jackets  ad  VMsts  2329202  t/I  ski  jkts  inc ski  vests  232922 RIB  st  jkts  iKc  ki  vets
241  Ski pats  2329234  H/S ski  pants  23293  HB ski  pants
25) Ski sais  and ovra&Jlso
20)  rt  pants  232N401  N mork  paPts inc maistbied  overalls  233401 1 mLk pants In  adisthuaid  oeals
271  veralls.  overalls  and  jupsuiltsn
21l  bat  ohirts  loot  kiatl  2318100  N/S nork shirts  2321140  Il/  _k  shirts
293 Overall and non-type  jackets  232N4tl  N/S  overall I  ark  type jils  221411 Hit  owrall  *  _tk  tW  jktsWEtN112  IlUl  I  trEtlmuu)
REKtilIm KEsrEN O  nuaCIim  smWIms  AN tIE  SIC  CITEIMIES
US Prod"in  Categarin  SIC Coon)l  US trataum  Categlae  ISIC  Caeil
Pr.dmcti.  6Fuul a  bscrh ptioa  2414  t  29133  1912  &  M4l
IEItS  U  MS  '  1t16IEAR m  USKhI
55)  Paljis  dW  other  asightUer
34) Sal
57) lbdrmhnrts  2254121  It l2ghtu.t  uodsthris  0  t-s,hts  for  oateruer  2254221  K llhtmeur  a  ts  n  t  -rts  tr  atri  r
2254131  C hgqttqt  aIbshrts  as  t-sJrts  for meternwr  22543  I  li£htmqt edrts  to  t-ats  for itwfar
2254142  NIl sl1eweless  athletic  tp  mudehrts  2254142  Nil  Se  "l  atbhetic  type uudmhrts
35) Thereal  idrneew
51) gait  bries  C s  horts  2254161  I  to briefis I  almrts  2254242  Nil km  slrts
2254171  B kt  briefs  I  shorts  22M4IM  H ka brief
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APPENDIX  TABLE  2
RELATION  BETWEEN  THE  TEN  APPAREL  GROUPS
AND  THE  MFA  AND  US PRODUCTION  GROUPINGS
APPAREL  MFA  US PRODUCTION
GROUP  CATEGORIES  GROUPINGS
1. DRESSES  336,  436, 636  30
2. SKIRTS  342,1  442, 642  53
3. PLAYSUITS  337,  637  522
4. SWEATERS  345,  445,  446,  11,  36
645,  646
5. TROUSERS  347,  348,  447,  12,  13,  14,  15,
448,  647,  648  20,  21*,  24,
25*,  26,  44,
45*,  48*, 49,
51,  54
6.  MEN'S  COATS  334,  434, 634  3,  4, 16,  17,
21*,  23,  29
7.  WOMEN'S  COATS  335,3  435,  635  37,  38,  39,  42,
45*,  47
8.  WOVEN  SHIRTS  340,  341,  440,  7, 8, 28,  33
640,  641
9. KNIT  SHIRTS  338,  339,  438,  9, 10,  19, 34,
638,  639  35,  43
10.  UNDERWEAR  352,4  652  57,  59  60,  61,
62,  63'
Items  marked  with  an asterisk  are  suits  (e.g.  jogging  suits)  which  comprise
both trousers  as  well as coats.  Each  group  is  thus  credited  with  half the
quantity  and  value  figures  of these  items.
lSome  items  in  MFA  category  342  may  also  be found  in  production  grouping
31 (women's  suits  & pantsuits.)
2Production  grouping  52  may  also include  some  items  from  MFA  category
859.
3Some  items  in  MFA category  335  may  also  be included  in  production
grouping  31 (women's  suits  & pantsuits.)
4Some items  in  MFA category  352  may  also  be included  in  production
grouping  67 (women's/girls'/infants'  robes  & housecoats.)
5Production  grouping  63  may also  include  some  items  from  MFA category
459.xii
The  domestic  price  of each  of the  ten  apparel  groups  was computed  as a
quantity-weighted  aierage  of the  unit  values  of the  production  groupings  which
make  up the  group. 3 Similarly,  the  import  price  of each  apparel  group  was
taken  to  be a quantity-weighted  average  of the  unit  values  of the  MFA
categories  which  make  up the  group,  and the  quota  utilization  ratio  for  each
apparel  group  was  calculated  as a quota-weighted  average  of the  utilization
ratios  of the  component  MFA  categories. 4
Our trade  data exclude  the  MFA 800  series  (silk  blends  or  non-cotton
vegetable  fibers),  which  was first  introduced  in 1986.  This  may introduce  some
inconsistency  in the  data  set  since  the  US production  data are  classified
according  to type  of apparel  rather  than  material.  For  example,  for  Group  1
(dresses),  the  US price  and  US sales  figures  may  partly  reflect  prices  and
sales  of silk  dresses  but the  import  prices  and  quantities  will not.  However,
a quick  glance  at  U.S. production  figures  for  which  we have some information
on fabric  breakdown  indicates  that  this  should  not  pose a serious  problem. 5
Information  on tariffs  and  transport  costs  by MFA category  was taken
from  the  1986  U.S. IM-145  Import  Trade  tapes.  As 1986  was the  only  year for
which  we had  reliable  data  on tape,  we assumed  little  or  no change  in the  ad
valorem  tariff  rates  and  unit  transport  costs  in the  period  under  study,  and
applied  the  1986  figures  to the  years  1981  through  1988.6  The  tariff  rates  and
unit transport  costs  of each  of the  ten  apparel  groups  were computed  as
weighted  averages7  of the  tariff  rates  and  transport  costs  of the  MFA
categories  comprising  the  group,  thus  insofar  as the  relative  composition  of
the  groups  changed  over the  years,  so too  did  the  group  tariff  rates  and
transport  costs. Also,  note that  MFA  category  440  was  not  under  quota  for  any
of the  eight  years  we consider.  In the  earlier  years,  there  were also  severalxiii
other  categories  that  were  not  under  quota.  Such  categories  were  not used  in
computing  the  apparel  group  license  utilization  ratios.
Information  on the  concentration  in license  holdings  in Hong  Kong  came
from  the  1990  Preliminary  Allocation  Ouota  Holders'  List issued  by the  Textile
Controls  Registry  in  Hong  Kong.  Whereas  there  are  frequent  temporary  transfers
of licenses,  permanent  transfers  occur  much less  often, 8 and the  license
allocation  in  all  probability  does  not alter  much over  the  years.  Thus,  we
applied  the 1990  allocation  for  the  years  1981  through  1988  and  calculated  the
concentration  index  for  each  group  as quantity-weighted  averages  of the
concentration  indices  of the  MFA  cacegories  that  make up the  group.  As in the
case  of the  tariff  and transport  data  mentioned  above,  insofar  as the  weights
change  from  year to  year,  so  will the  concentration  index,  even if the
allocation  remains  fixed.
Note that  quotas  are imposed  on (and  hence  lic.enses  are  allocr 4 for)
the  following  categories  jointly:  333/334/335,  with a sub-quota  on 333/334  and
a sub-quota  on 335;  and  633/634/635,  with  a sub-quota  on 633/634  and a sub-
quota  on 635.  The licenses  for  sub-categories  333  and  334  are  completely
transferable,  but there  is less  flexibility  in  transferring  licenses  between
these  two  sub-categories  and sub-category  335.  The  same  applies  to sub-
categories  633,  634  and  635.  We had information  on the  ratio  of licenses
utilized,  and  holdings  of licenses  for  333/4,  633/4,  335  and  635,  but  we were
only  interested  in categories  334  and 634,  which  are  components  of Group  6
(men's  coats)  and  categories  335  and  635,  which  are  components  of Group  7
(women's  coats).  Given  the  transferability  wichin  sub-categories,  we took  the
ratio  of licenses  utilized  for  category  334  to  be the  ratio  of licensesxiv
utilized  for  categories  333/4  together,  and similarly  for  category  634.  We did
the  same  for  concentration  indices.
For  categories  338/9,  separate  sub-quotas  are imposed  on 338/9-T  (tank
tops);  and  338/9-0  (other  knit tops,  excluding  tank  tops.)  In order  to
calculate  the  concentration  index  for  the  category  338/9  as a  whole,  we had to
weight  the indice-  for  the  sub-categories  by their  shares  in total  shipments.
The same  a?plied  to categories  347  and 348,  i.e.,  w. had to  weight  the
concentration  indices  by their  shares  in total  shipments  in  order  to get  the
concen.tration  index  for  347/8  as  a whole.xv
2. Estimations  for  Missing  Observations
2.1  Production  data
In i981  and  1982,  US production  figures  on shirts  did  not  make  a clear
distinction  between  woven  shirts  and  knit  shirts,  We were only  able to  extract
information  on production  groupings  33/34/35  as a whole,  where  33-Woven  Shirts
and 34/35-Knit  Shirts.  We estimated  the  quantity  and  value  of production
groupings  33  and 34/35  using  the  following  equations,  which  were  obtained  from
regressing  1983-1988  data:
qt - 0.38 + 0.06 t - 0.01 t2
vt - 0.50 + 0.06 t - 0.01 t2
where t - year (1-1981, 2-1982),
q  - share  of ca egory  33 in total  quantity  of 33/34/35,  and
v - share  of category  33 in total  va'.ue  of 33/34/35.
Having  obtained  q and  v, we calculated:
Q33 _ q.Q33/34/35, where  Q - quantity, and
V33 - v.V33 /34 /35, where V - value.
This is  admittedly  a somewhat  crude  approach  since  we had only six
observations  to regress,  but it  seems  preferable  to leaving  out  the 1981  and
1982  figures  altogether.
2.2  Import  data
For  1981,  we had the  quantity  imported  of categories  333/334/335
together,  but not  separately.9  We estimated  the  quantity  imported  of
categories  334  and  335  by the  same  method  described  above,  using  the  following
equations  which  were estimated  from  1982-88  data:
qt334 - 0.36 + 0.003 t
qt335 - 0.56 + 0.0005 t,xvi
where  q334 - share  of category  334  in total  shipments  of 333/4/5,
q335 - share  of category  335  in total  shipments  of 333/4/5,  and
t  - time (1-1981).
We then  estimated  the  shipments  of categories  334  and 335  in 1981  as follows:
Q334 _ q334 Q333/4/5
Q335  _ q335 Q333/4/5.
For  1985,  we had the  quota  size,  quantity  imported  and  ratio  of
licenses  utilized  for  categories  338/339  together,  but  not separately.  We
estimated  this  ratio  for  categories  338  and  339  using  the  following  equation
obtained  from  regressing  the  1981-1984  and  1986-1988  data:
ut  - 90.37  + 1.82  t
where  ut - percent  utilized,  and
t  - time (5-1985).
We then  estimated  the  shipments,  Q, as: 10
Q - u.(Quota 338/9).xvii
END  NOTES  FOR  DATA  APPENDIX
1.In  1988,  a number  of new  establLshments  were added  to the  survey.  Most of
these  establishments  began  operating  after  the  1982  Census.  The  Bureau  made  no
attempt  to  determine  when they  began  operating  or to obtain  prior  years'  data.
Therefore  the  1988  data  may  not  be strictly  comparable  to previous  years.
2.The  customs  import  value  divided  by the  import  quantity  is is  exactly  the
f.o.b.  Hong  Kong  Drice  which  is referred  to in the  text,  and there  is every
reason  to expect  that  this  price  includes  the  import  license  price.
3.The  reason  why  we use quantity  weights  is  as follows.  Each  apparel  group  j
consists  of one  or more  production  grouping  i, i-l,  ... ,n.  Let Pj denote  the
unit  price  of apparel  group  J,  P$j  the  unit  price  of production  grouping  i  of
apparel  group  j and  Qij the  quantilty  produced  of production  grouping  i of
apparel  group  j.  Then:
Pj  - (Value  of Imports)j/(Quantity  of Imports)j
- Zi [PiJQijQ/iQij]
- vi  [Pij(Qij/  iQij)I*
4.Each  apparel  group  J consists  of a few  MFA categories,  i.  We use  quantity
weights  to compute  the import  price  for  an apparel  group  from  the import
prices  of its  component  MFA  categories  for  the  same  reason  ixplained  in the
previous  end-note.  Similarly,  if  we let  Uj be the  utilization  ratio  for
apparel  group  J, EVij  be the  total  quota  on apparel  group  J,  U 1 be the
utilization  ratio  for  MFA  category  i  of apparel  group  J and  V  6e the  quota
on MFA  category  i  of apparel  group  J, then  we use  quota  weighit  to compute  UJ
because:
Uj  - (Quantity  of Imports)j  /(Total  Quota)j
_x  [Uijvi  /ivi]
1 i  [Uij(V-  4 i  )
5.Consider,  for  example,  two  items  most likely  to  be made of silk:  women's
dresses  and  slips.  In 1985  and  1986,  dresses  made  of  material  other  than
cotton,  wool or  manmade  fibers  accounted  for  only  about  4 per  cent of the
total  quantity  of  women's,  misses'  and  juniors'  dresses  produced;  and  0 per
cent  of the  women's  full-length  and  half-length  slips  produced  in the  US were
made of  material  other  than  cotton,  wool  or manmade  fibers.
6.In  fact,  &d  valorem  tariff  rates  changed  very  little  between  the  GATT
rounds,  so this  is  not an  unreasonable  assumption.
7.We  used  value  weights  for  the  ad  valorem  tariffs  and  quantity  weights  for
the  unit  transport  costs.  Let  t  denote  the  ad valorem  tariff  rate  on apparel
group  J, ti  the  ad  valorem  tarlff  rate  on  MFA  category  i  of apparel  group  J,
P.  the  unit  price  of MFA  categoLy  i of apparel  group  J, and  Qij the  quantity
o- imports  of  MFA category  i  of apparel  group  j.  Then:
tj-  (Tariff  Revenue)  /(Value  of Imports)j
Z- (tijPpjQij  ;ijQIjI
1i  zltij(  ijQii/ lpljQij)]xviii
8.The  following  figures  are  reported  in  Sung (1989):
xsaz  Temporary  Transfe&  Permanent  Transher*
1981  20.1  12.4
1982  37.1  17.5
1983  40.2  22.1
1984  33.7  22.8
1985  27.9  10.2
1986  16.0  7.8
1987  21.4  11.3
*As  percentage  of restraint  limit.
9.This  was traced  to  a few  missing  pages  in  the  1981  Expired  Performance
RKRort~  .
1O.Most  of the  time,  we use  categories  338/9  together  rather  than  separately,
but this  was  necessary  for  some  computations  involving  weighting.Contact
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